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Inequality in the Sharing Economy
Gregory M. Stein†
INTRODUCTION
This article examines the extent to which the rise of the
sharing economy may exacerbate existing inequality. It describes
the sharing economy and its frequent use of dynamic pricing as a
means of allocating scarce resources. It then focuses on three
types of commodities—necessities, inelastic goods and services,
and public goods and services—and discusses why the dynamic
pricing of these three types of commodities raises the greatest
inequality concerns. The article concludes by asking whether
some type of intervention is warranted and examines the
advantages and drawbacks of government action, action by the
private sector, or no action at all.
Consumers and providers both benefit from the recent rise
of the sharing economy. Consumers can access a wider range of
goods and services on an as-needed basis and no longer need to
own a smaller number of costly assets that sit unused most of the
time. Providers can engage in profitable short-term ventures,
working on their own schedules and enjoying many new
opportunities to supplement their income.
The sharing economy has exploded as a result of
technological advances, particularly the pervasiveness of powerful
pocket-sized supercomputers and the ability of intermediaries to
process vast amounts of factual information instantaneously.
When a prospective rider requests a pick-up from a ride-sharing
service, that information is processed by a server that alerts nearby
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drivers, calculates a price dynamically based on ever-shifting
supply and demand, and relays pickup information to the
requester’s smartphone within seconds. As demand for rides
surges—when a thunderstorm begins or the Super Bowl ends—the
algorithm enables prices to increase correspondingly. While
prospective customers might view these sudden spikes as price
gouging, the intermediary claims to be practicing capitalism in its
purest form by pricing the commodity dynamically.1 Supply and
demand curves always cross somewhere, and the middleman earns
its commission by performing its matchmaking services and
determining the equilibrium price in real time.
Surge pricing is a dramatic change from the method of
establishing charges that prevailed before the advent of
smartphones and high-speed data management. Taxi rates are
frequently set by a public authority and are calculated almost
entirely based on distance traveled and time elapsed, with little
effort at pricing rides dynamically in response to shifts in
demand.2 In addition, some jurisdictions limit the number of taxis
that can be on the road.3 At busy times, then, demand for taxis at
the fixed price will dramatically outstrip supply, particularly in
cities that cap the number of taxis.4 In these settings, only those
who are both fortunate and capable of paying the fixed price will

1 This article generally uses the term “commodity” when the subject of a
transaction may be either a good or a service. Goods and services are sometimes subject to
different legal treatment, as, for example, under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
See U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (limiting application of
U.C.C. Article 2 to “transactions in goods”); Stacy-Ann Elvy, Hybrid Transactions and the
INTERNET of Things: Goods, Services, or Software?, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77, 104–24
(2017) (discussing uncertainties in the applicability of Article 2 to transactions involving
both goods and services).
2 See, e.g., N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, Taxi Fare, NYC.GOV,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/tlc/passengers/taxi-fare.page [https://perma.cc/J7JM-JNVC]
(setting forth taxi fares in and around New York City). There are modest exceptions to this
statement, such as rush-hour and evening surcharges. Id. These added costs are nothing
more than rudimentary versions of dynamic pricing. Because they are fixed and not
floating, they do not reflect the precise supply and demand at the moment the passenger
boards the taxi. Rather, they are rough estimates as to how much demand tends to increase
or supply tends to decrease under very specific, predictably recurring conditions.
3 The City of New York, for example, with a population of just under 8.4
million people, plus hundreds of thousands of tourists and daytime commuters, has
authorized only 13,587 taxi medallions. See N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning, Population –
Current and Projected Populations, NYC.GOV, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/datamaps/nyc-population/current-future-populations.page [https://perma.cc/G5FS-UKU9];
NYC Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, Yellow Cab, NYC.GOV, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/tlc/
businesses/yellow-cab.page [https://perma.cc/72DZ-KEWY].
4 Even if off-duty drivers decide to return to work during a thunderstorm, the
price will remain fixed. The regulated market allows for increases in supply, but only up
to the total number of taxi medallions, and does not permit increases in price.
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be able to garner one of the inadequate number of taxis.5 In other
words, there is a shortage of a necessary service, and the limited
available supply is distributed more or less randomly among
those who are willing and able to pay.6 Everyone else in need of
transportation must employ substitutes, by paying for an
alternative type of auto ride,7 renting a car, hopping on a bus or a
subway train, or using one’s own two feet. These second-choice
alternatives are presumably more costly either in price or
inconvenience—walking during a rainstorm is only a partial
substitute for remaining dry—and less affluent people are priced
out of some portions of the market.8
Other service providers, such as sports and entertainment
venues, are less subject to regulation, but still largely adhere to
archaic pricing models. For instance, prices for movies, concerts,
and sporting events have historically been fixed, with price
differentials typically based solely on the location of the seat and
perhaps the day of the week or time of the year. More recently,
some of these providers have begun to dip their toes into the water
of dynamic pricing.9 Hotels and—especially—commercial airlines
have been more advanced in adjusting prices based on how well
rooms and seats are selling.10 But hotel efforts at dynamic pricing
seem amateurish and rudimentary in comparison to, say, a
typical ride-sharing service, while airline pricing structures are
so complex, with so many seat and price categories, that they are
difficult to parse. Airlines also face unique security concerns that
have led to limits on the transferability of tickets. Many hotel and
5 Drivers might also be tempted to impose unauthorized surcharges or to force
passengers to share cars with strangers, in effect scalping their own driving services by
illegally increasing their take.
6 The reverse is also true: During times of excess supply, the price must remain
fixed and drivers must be fortunate to find passengers. Those passengers who could afford
a taxi only at a lower price are out of luck, even though drivers might be willing to charge
less at these times.
7 If a ride-sharing company is competing with the medallion taxis, the uptick
in demand for taxis will raise prices for ride-shares, which are a close substitute. Some
people will opt for the shared-ride alternative, but those who cannot afford the suddenly
increased surge price will be unable to. As demand increases, so does the price, which
makes this option unaffordable for some.
8 For a similar analysis of the allocation of public curbside parking, see
Vanessa Casado Pérez, The Street View of Property, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 375–78 (2019)
(comparing finding a parking spot to capturing a wild animal).
9 Some baseball teams, for example, now adjust their ticket prices based on the
quality of the opponent. See, e.g., Red Sox Single Game Ticket Pricing, MLB.COM,
https://www.mlb.com/redsox/tickets/single-game-tickets/seating-pricing [https://perma.cc/YC
8E-R5EN] (identifying five different “tiers” of Boston Red Sox tickets, with prices depending
on the visiting team—sorry, Brewers fans!—and the day of the week).
10 See Tom Chitty, This Is How Airlines Price Tickets, CNBC (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/03/how-do-airlines-price-seat-tickets.html [https://perma.cc
/A4GW-WSU2] (“[W]hat seems random is actually airlines’ dynamic pricing, using a
strategy called airline revenue management.”).
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airline patrons also have weeks of advance notice in which to
monitor prices before making, and sometimes modifying, a
purchase, while hailing a local car ride is typically a spur of the
moment decision of lower import.
In other words, if a service has a fixed price, such as a taxi
fare established by regulation, and purchasers have little time for
or interest in employing alternatives, then it is distributed
primarily on the basis of chance, such as happening to be standing
where a taxi discharges its previous passenger.11 When demand
outstrips supply, the shortage will force those who are not
fortunate enough to secure a taxi to seek out less desirable
options.12 By contrast, if the service is priced dynamically based on
ever-changing supply and demand, such as an Uber ride, a lastminute airline ticket, a street-vendor umbrella in Manhattan, or
bottled water after a hurricane, then the price keeps rising until
demand drops to the point of supply, and the element of chance is
replaced by willingness and ability to pay.13 The cost of a
dynamically priced good or service is highest when demand is high
or supply is low.
This phenomenon is not limited to amenities provided by
the private market. The city of San Francisco now uses surge
pricing for on-street public parking.14 London, Stockholm, and
Singapore restrict access to their busiest center-city streets

11 There are exceptions to this statement as well. Taxi drivers may prefer
passengers who are taking longer trips, which means a reduction in down time without a
paying customer, or passengers traveling to livelier neighborhoods, where they may be more
likely to pick up a return fare. They may also favor white passengers over passengers of color.
See, e.g., Shelby Steele, Hailing While Black, TIME (July 30, 2001), http://content.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,1000422,00.html [https://perma.cc/8R9Q-BLZ6] (“I know I can
survive the racial profiling of a cabby. What makes me most nervous is the anxiety that I have
wrongly estimated the degree of racism in American life.”); see also Gillian B. White, Uber
and Lyft Drivers Are Failing Black Riders, ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.the
atlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/uber-lyft-and-the-false-promise-of-fair-rides/506000
[https://perma.cc/B9VZ-3L6P] (describing a recent study of Uber and Lyft finding that “black
riders faced longer wait times and more frequent cancellations than white riders” and that
riders with “black-sounding names” were more likely to face cancellation).
12 In the short run, they may consult a subway map, while in the long run, they
may lobby for the licensing of more taxis.
13 For similar reasons, UPS recently instituted surge pricing for deliveries on
particularly busy days, such as Black Friday. See Paul Ziobro, UPS to Add Delivery
Surcharges for Black Friday, Christmas Orders, WALL STREET J. (June 19, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ups-to-add-delivery-surcharges-for-black-friday-christmas
-orders-1497883509 [https://perma.cc/AA66-LFDU].
14 How It Works, SFPARK, http://sfpark.org/how-it-works [https://perma.cc/JC
R6-KAMH] (“SFpark uses demand-responsive pricing to open up parking spaces on each
block and reduce circling and double-parking. Rates may vary by block, time of day and
day of week.”). See generally DONALD SHOUP, THE HIGH COST OF FREE PARKING xxi–xxiv
(2005) (describing San Francisco’s rationale).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233919

2020]

INEQUALITY IN THE SHARING ECONOMY

791

during the workday by employing congestion pricing.15 At their
most extreme, these programs increase or decrease fares for road
usage based on time and traffic.16 Some toll roads charge higher
prices during peak travel times,17 and others make lower-traffic
lanes available to those willing to pay an upcharge.18
Do these features of the sharing economy increase existing
inequality? The fact that affluent people can afford higher-quality
goods and better service is not news, and the fairness or
unfairness of economic inequality is not the subject of this
article.19 But commodities formerly had a fixed price that allowed
prospective purchasers to budget their money and plan future
purchases. Sharing-economy prices are more fluid, which means
that goods and services become more costly as they become more
essential. This creates greater uncertainty for prospective
purchasers, particularly those of more modest means.20
Technological advances exacerbate this problem. Computing
power is consistently increasing,21 and most adults today carry a
powerful mini-computer in their pocket or purse.22 This increases
efficiency by allowing for the better use of resources that might
otherwise be wasted and permits more precise pricing.23 But if the
15 Christina Anderson et al., 3 Far-Flung Cities Offer Clues to Unsnarling
Manhattan’s Streets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/
nyregion/congestion-pricing-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/E8X9-TYT4].
16 Id. (comparing Singapore’s and Stockholm’s approaches).
17 See, e.g., 66 Express Lanes Inside the Beltway, VA. DEP’T TRANSP., http://www.66
expresslanes.org/about_the_lanes/default.asp [https://perma.cc/Q9NL-B5XY] (“How Do The
Lanes Work? . . . . Roadway sensors will monitor traffic volumes. Toll prices will adjust to
manage demand for the lanes and keep traffic free-flowing. When there’s more traffic, prices
will be higher. When there’s less traffic, prices will be lower.”).
18 I-85 Express Lanes (HOT Lanes), GA. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY, https://dps.georgia.
gov/i-85-expres-lanes-hot-lanes [https://perma.cc/75BW-FWPE] (“Vehicles with fewer than
three occupants, including solo drivers, will be able to choose whether to use the general
purpose lanes or pay for a more reliable trip in the Express Lanes.”).
19 For an interesting discussion of the degree to which inequality may be
biologically inherited, see Lucy A. Jewel, The Biology of Inequality, 95 DENV. L. REV. 609,
612 (2018) (“[E]nvironmentally mediated biological effects can . . . be passed down from
one generation to the next . . . .”).
20 See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 104 (2016)
(noting, in a section entitled, “The Platform Economy: Romantic Utopia or Nightmare
Dystopia?,” that the platform economy can be hailed either “as the anti-corporate utopian
answer to twentieth-century discontentment or an accelerated path to further injustice
and inequality”).
21 Moore’s Law, which holds that computing power will continue to double
every two years, has held true for nearly fifty years. MOORE’S LAW, www.mooreslaw.org
[https://perma.cc/LHJ9-LYN2].
22 “[A]n iPhone [has] more computing power than all of NASA had during the
Apollo days . . . .” David Grossman, How Do NASA’s Apollo Computers Stack Up to an
iPhone?, POPULAR MECHANICS (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.popularmechanics.com/space/
moon-mars/a25655/nasa-computer-iphone-comparison/ [https://perma.cc/N9E8-LQQ7].
23 “A consistent finding across all our counterfactual analyses is that peer-topeer markets improve consumer welfare. Increases in surplus grow with the fraction of
the population that has access to the marketplace and the fraction of supply and demand
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resource is both scarce and surge-priced, its cost increases during
shortages and rationing is now based on price rather than on chance.
Instead of allocating the good based on a ration coupon or good
fortune we instead distribute it on the basis of how much prospective
buyers can pay.24
When surge pricing is in effect, the charges for finite private
commodities, such as lodging, and finite public commodities, such
as space for your vehicle on a crowded highway, are less predictable
and more prone to spikes. Demand-based pricing systems leave the
most price-sensitive consumers less able to procure certain goods
and services, some of which are essential, and less able to plan
ahead. These pricing impacts may also affect substitutes for the
good: There is evidence that an increase in home-sharing via
platforms such as Airbnb leads to higher rents and purchase prices
for homes.25 As property owners shift to leasing their units to
transient occupants via sharing platforms, where they can
sometimes earn far more,26 fewer units will be available for
permanent residents and prices will rise.27 Residential units are
limited, and it is slow and costly to add housing stock.28 But it is
also possible that the rise in home-sharing will induce property
owners to reuse their existing stock more efficiently, renovating

requests that are fulfilled.” Samuel Fraiberger & Arun Sundararajan, Peer-to-Peer
Rental Markets in the Sharing Economy 4 (Sept. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2574337 [https://perma.cc/AH73-YAKR].
24 This phenomenon, too, is nothing new: During wartime, ration coupons may
be resold illegally on secondary markets. A form of scalping takes place, and the market
economy defeats well-intentioned efforts to regulate it. But technological advances
further enable these practices.
25 Dayne Lee, Note, How Airbnb Short-Term Rentals Exacerbate Los Angeles’s
Affordable Housing Crisis: Analysis and Policy Recommendations, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 229, 234–40 (2016).
26 See, e.g., Zoe Greenberg, New York City Looks to Crack Down on Airbnb
Amid Housing Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/
18/nyregion/new-york-city-airbnb-crackdown.html?action=click&module=In%20Other%
20News&pgtype=Homepage&action=click&module=News&pgtype=Homepage [https://
perma.cc/2H8G-965U] (discussing a proposed New York City law that would “prevent
landlords and tenants from illegally renting out apartments for a few days at a time to
tourists, a phenomenon that the city says has aggravated the housing crisis by making
short-term rentals more profitable than long-term leases”).
27 See Kyle Barron et al., The Effect of Home-Sharing on House Prices and
Rents: Evidence from Airbnb (Jan. 23, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3006832 [https://perma.cc/9ZAS-WC5P].
28 See Candace Jackson, The New American Dream Home Is One You Never
Have to Leave, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/13/opinion
/sunday/real-estate-housing-market-dream-home.html [https://perma.cc/8VUY-NM8Y]
(describing new home designs that include separable portions that can be let out on a
sporadic basis).
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unused or dilapidated units and renting out bedrooms that might
otherwise sit idle.29
There are several possible responses to mismatches such as
these. One solution is to prohibit surge pricing, as taxi commissions
historically have done and as many states used to do with respect
to ticket scalping.30 Market pressures limit the effectiveness of this
approach at times of peak demand, and illegal ticket scalping was
common and hard to police when such rules were in effect.31 The
private market has attempted to address this problem:
Ticketmaster, for example, has experimented with paperless
ticketing that makes it difficult to resell at a profit,32 though
consumer response has been overwhelmingly negative.33 Bruce
Springsteen took a different approach, setting prices for his recent
Broadway show at considerably less than the market would have
borne,34 and Kid Rock makes a small number of tickets available at
a very modest price.35 Efforts such as these may be doomed to fail.
The Super Bowl made five hundred of the least desirable seats
available by lottery one year at a bargain rate of $600. Sixty
percent of those tickets were resold within twenty-four hours, some
for as much as $2,000.36
The producers of Hamilton, by contrast, have raised boxoffice prices to the market rate, capturing the full value of the
license for the party that created it rather than for an
intermediary reseller.37 This solves the scalping problem, but
29 See Erez Aloni, Capturing Excess in the On-Demand Economy, 39 U. HAW.
L. REV. 315, 316–17 (2017) (distinguishing between sharing that makes use of excess
capacity and more traditional commercial activity that does not).
30 See Gregory M. Stein, Will Ticket Scalpers Meet the Same Fate as Spinal Tap
Drummers? The Sale and Resale of Concert and Sports Tickets, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2014).
31 Cf. id. at 42–45 (discussing more recent government efforts).
32 Id. at 37–40.
33 Id. at 37.
34 Tickets sold initially for $75 to $850 but were available on resale websites for
as much as $9,999. Neil Irwin, Why Surge Prices Make Us So Mad: What Springsteen,
Home Depot and a Nobel Winner Know, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/10/14/upshot/why-surge-prices-make-us-so-mad-what-springsteen-home-depotand-a-nobel-winner-know.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share [https://p
erma.cc/W5EK-HZSL] (“[O]ne view of the Springsteen approach is that it is economically
irrational. But another is that it is part of a long-term relationship between a performer
and his fans.”).
35 Stein, supra note 30, at 7–8.
36 Matthew Futterman, NFL to Charge New York Prices, WALL STREET J.
(Sept. 17, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873246656045790794241
46436620.html?mod=wsj_valetbottom_email [https://perma.cc/5BVA-JLZL].
37 Michael Paulson, ‘Hamilton’ Raises Ticket Prices: The Best Seats Will Now
Cost $849, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/09/theater/
hamilton-raises-ticket-prices-the-best-seats-will-now-cost-849.html [https://perma.cc/R
YG5-LTSH] (describing this as “part of a broader effort to stanch the loss of tens of
millions of dollars in potential revenue to scalpers”). The article goes on to note, “A New
York Times analysis suggests that resellers are making $60 million per year on
‘Hamilton’ tickets—money that does not go to the show’s producers, creators or
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only by making the ticket exceedingly expensive to the first
purchaser and pricing many prospective patrons out of the
market from the outset.38 To the extent that restrictions on
scalping fail, due either to market pressures or technological
work-arounds, the price rises and the producer or intermediary
earns more.39 Those unwilling or unable to pay the higher price
cannot enjoy the now-costlier service.40
Another response to inadequate supply is to offer
alternative services to those unable to afford the market price of
the primary service. This is particularly important for goods and
services that are essential or nearly essential and for commodities
traditionally provided by the public sector. Cities can provide
mass transit options to those unable to afford the surge price for
ride-sharing services.41 Government can provide monetary or inkind support to those who cannot afford essential services, as it
does with nutritional assistance, housing vouchers, and health
care subsidies.
The alternative services might even be funded by part of
the fee paid for the primary service, as when highway tolls,
gasoline taxes, parking fees, or revenues from congestion-priced
streets are used to pay for mass transit improvements.42 In this
way, users fortunate enough to enjoy the more desirable good or
service, who contribute to the shortage, subsidize users of the less
desirable substitute. But those who are willing and able to pay
the market rate, including the surge rate, may resent subsidizing
those who cannot and do not, particularly if more and more users
cease to benefit from the public alternative.43 If yesterday’s more
employees.” Id. Note that information on the box office price is not available from the
primary source (the box office), which displays only prices for resales; tickets issued by
the box office appear to sell out instantly.
38 Id. Even Hamilton makes a small number of tickets available by lottery for
$10 shortly before each performance. Ham4Ham Lottery, HAMILTON MUSICAL, https://
hamiltonmusical.com/lottery/ [https://perma.cc/8ZEQ-RWFZ].
39 In settings such as Hamilton tickets, the shortage is caused by the fact that
supply is incapable of meeting demand.
40 Or they may choose to enjoy the ticket themselves while foregoing the potential
gain from reselling it.
41 This option is financially viable only in places with sufficient population density
to sustain these public alternatives.
42 See, e.g., Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Uber Hit With Cap as New York City Takes
Lead in Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/ny
region/uber-vote-city-council-cap.html [https://perma.cc/P52C-LG7Z] (“[New York] Gov.
Andrew M. Cuomo, who controls the subway, has said he will push for congestion pricing
during the next state legislative session to help pay for an ambitious, multibillion dollar
overhaul plan for the subway.”).
43 See, e.g., Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Subway Ridership Dropped Again in New
York as Passengers Flee to Uber, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/20
18/08/01/nyregion/subway-ridership-nyc-metro.html [https://perma.cc/MKZ3-ZTJM]
(“[R]idership dropped for the second year in a row as passengers flee the system for Uber
and other ride-hailing services, draining the transit system of badly needed revenue.”);
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affluent subway commuters become tomorrow’s Lyft passengers,
they will oppose surcharges on Lyft rides to support the subway
they no longer use.44
This article examines whether the rapid growth of the
sharing economy, and its concomitant increased use of dynamic
pricing, will compound the amount of inequality our economic
system already fosters. It argues that, depending on the types of
goods or services in question, different levels of market intervention
might be necessary to protect those who are negatively affected by
increased prices. Part I of this article describes the sharing economy
in brief, defines some basic terms, discusses why the sharing
economy has blossomed, describes the dynamic pricing that is widely
used by sharing platforms, and asks whether this is the fairest
method of allocating scarce goods. Part II focuses on necessities,
inelastic goods and services, and public goods and services, and
discusses why the dynamic pricing of these three types of
commodities raises the greatest inequality concerns. Part III turns
to the short- and long-run effects of the rapid transition to a sharing
economy, examining how less affluent people are likely to fare at
first and then later on, as these changes become more firmly woven
into the fabric of the economy. Finally, Part IV asks whether some
type of intervention is warranted and examines the advantages and
drawbacks of government action, action by the private sector, or no
action at all.
I.

THE SHARING ECONOMY

This Part reviews the characteristics of the sharing
economy and discusses the associated rise in the use of dynamic
pricing for scarce goods. Next, it describes the benefits of the
sharing economy and the ways in which those benefits account for
its growth. Finally, it explores some likely future developments in
the sharing economy.
A.

Terminology and Characteristics

The sharing economy—also referred to as the platform,
gig, peer-to-peer, access, or on-demand economy—is somewhat

Tracey Lindeman, Ride-Hailing Is Deepening Social and Economic Inequity in the US,
VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 10, 2018), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/wj4n
8q/uber-lyft-are-making-public-transit-worse-ridesharing-cities [https://perma.cc/L6RM-U
PRD] (noting that “the growth of individualized transportation options is cannibalizing
public transit—and without good, reliable, vast public transit networks, we’ll never have
social and economic equity”).
44 See id.
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of a misnomer.45 “Share” is defined as “to participate in, use, or
experience in common.”46 The word may connote bestowing
something without consideration,47 as when a child shares their
candy with a classmate, where it would be unusual to expect
payment.48 By contrast, few transactions in the new sharing
economy lack consideration.49 Widespread use of the term
“sharing” within the industry may, at some level, be intended to
discourage regulation of the industry.50 Former U.S. Secretary of
Labor Robert Reich has even labeled the sharing economy the
“share-the-scraps” economy.51
A more accurate name for this new economy might be the
“leasing” or, perhaps, “subleasing” or “licensing” economy.52 Shortterm transactions such as beach rentals used to be brokered by real
estate agents and were cumbersome to arrange via phone, fax, and
snail mail.53 But Airbnb, founded only in 2008, had more than four

45 See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information,
and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1634 (2017) (discussing the vagueness of the term);
see also Steven Greenhouse, The Whatchamacallit Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/the-whatchamacallit-economy.html?emc=e
ta1 [https://perma.cc/LQ2Q-RREK] (listing several alternative names and discussing the
weaknesses and inaccuracies of each).
46 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1127 (2d ed. 1982).
47 For examples of new sharing platforms that operate without consideration, see
Dave Fagundes, Why Less Property Is More: Inclusion, Dispossession, & Subjective WellBeing, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1383–84 (2018) (giving examples of gratuitous sharing and
arguing that these types of transactions can increase subjective happiness).
48 Some readers may recall the public service announcement (and earworm)
“It’s Nice to Share,” which encouraged children to share. United Church of Christ & The
Episcopal Church, It’s Nice to Share, YOUTUBE (Nov. 19, 2008), https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=a3HeyqXESOg [https://perma.cc/GC9R-9PEQ].
49 See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE “SHARING” ECONOMY: ISSUES FACING
PLATFORMS, PARTICIPANTS, AND REGULATORS 10–11 (Nov. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/reports/sharing-economy-issues-facing-platforms-participantsregulators-federal-trade-commission-staff/p151200_ftc_staff_report_on_the_sharing_ec
onomy.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4PK-29QS] [hereinafter FTC, THE “SHARING” ECONOMY].
50 See Natasha Singer, Twisting Words to Make ‘Sharing’ Apps Seem Selfless,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/technology/twisting-words
-to-make-sharing-apps-seem-selfless.html [https://perma.cc/WDN6-37QM] (“Against the
backdrop of possible regulation, egalitarian-sounding words like ‘sharing’ and ‘partner’
distance start-ups, linguistically at least, from the traditionally regulated industries they
seek to displace.”).
51 Robert Reich, The Share-the-Scraps Economy, ROBERTREICH.ORG (Feb. 2, 2015),
http://robertreich.org/post/109894095095 [https://perma.cc/YH34-TY94] (“The big money goes
to the corporations that own the software. The scraps go to the on-demand workers.”).
52 Recognizing the individualized nature of providing and procuring services in
the sharing economy, one scholar has suggested calling it the “go-it-alone economy.” Daniel
J. Hemel, Pooling and Unpooling in the Uber Economy, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 286.
53 See, e.g., Kellen Zale, When Everything Is Small: The Regulatory Challenge of Scale
in the Sharing Economy, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 949, 977 (2016) (“While many of the underlying
activities occurring in the sharing economy, such as home-sharing and ride-hailing, have existed
long before the emergence of Uber and Airbnb, transaction costs previously limited such
activities to an ad-hoc or informal basis or within close-knit communities.”).
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million listings for short-term stays as of August 2017,54 stays that
can be booked in seconds with neither the landlord nor the tenant
ever having direct contact with another human being.55 Those who
provide strangers a ride in their car or a bed in their spare room
are little more than very short-term landlords or licensors.56 New
technology and platforms make leases of extremely short duration
far more feasible than in the past;57 a shared ride, despite the
closeness of the setting, might last only five or ten minutes.58 We
are familiar with residential terms of years, and an Airbnb stay is
similar in all but duration.59
Some observers, however, argue that the platform
economy is a new paradigm.60 In this view, the sharing economy
falls somewhere between a traditional capitalist model and a
new variation of that system that demands a different
regulatory approach.61 Notwithstanding the imprecision of the

54 Airbnb has more than seven million listings worldwide. Airbnb Fast Facts,
AIRBNB (2019), https://news.airbnb.com/fast-facts/ [https://perma.cc/JEU2-DATL]. By
contrast, the Hilton family of brands claims to be “one of the largest hospitality
companies in the world,” with more than 950,000 rooms. About Us, HILTON, https://www.
hilton.com/en/corporate/ [https://perma.cc/S39J-WHXK].
55 Zale, supra note 53, at 977 (“[C]ompanies like Airbnb and Uber facilitate
these connections almost instantaneously.”).
56 Cf. Walter Isaacson, How Uber and Airbnb Became Poster Children for the
Disruption Economy, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/
books/review/wild-ride-adam-lashinsky-uber-airbnb.html [https://perma.cc/E8AN-XGF
A] (arguing that the sharing economy can “allow people to make human connections in
an era that has become much more institutionalized”).
57 Sharing was not unheard of even before the smartphone revolution. Before
the advent of laptop computers, it was common for owners of large mainframes to allow
users the option to share time with other users, either for a fee or gratuitously. See
Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as
a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 289–96 (2004).
58 See Naomi Schoenbaum, Intimacy and Equality in the Sharing Economy, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 459, 459–60 (Nestor
Davidson et al. eds., 2018) (noting how fears of discrimination have led sharing platforms to
make transactions more anonymous and observing that this transition has costs of its own).
59 State law typically treats hotel stays and residential leases differently. See,
e.g., UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 1.202(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1974)
(excluding transient hotel or motel occupancy from the coverage of the Act). Some shortterm arrangements are construed as licenses under state law. JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN
W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 240 (3d ed. 1989) (distinguishing leases
from licenses and citing cases, while conceding that some of these issues are not completely
settled). Hotel stays and licenses share many, but not all, of the characteristics of leases.
60 Professor Rashmi Dyal-Chand argues that the platform economy is more of a
European-style coordinated market. Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing
Economy as an Alternative Capitalist System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 278–88 (2015) (drawing
parallels with Germany); cf. John Infranca, Intermediary Institutions and the Sharing
Economy, 90 TUL. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 31 (2016) (noting that, unlike traditional companies,
“[sharing] companies frequently do not own key assets or internalize core functions”).
61 Dyal-Chand, supra note 60, at 247 (“[T]he conceptual failure to understand
the sharing economy as a different kind of market is the primary cause of regulatory
failure in this arena.”).
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terms, this article will employ the phrases “sharing economy”
and “platform economy.”62
Rating systems have enhanced the popularity of sharing
platforms.63 Reputational rankings that appear reliable allow
participants to interact more comfortably with complete strangers,
providing a level of trust and consumer protection.64 “Do you want
a stranger staying in your home? No. But would you like Michelle
who went to Harvard, works in a bank, and has a five-star rating
as a guest on Airbnb? Sure!”65
This is true despite some readily apparent weaknesses in
the rating systems many sharing economy companies have
adopted.66 Rating systems may fall prey to behavioral and
psychological biases and are subject to manipulation by users.67 “In
general, we believe that users are likely overstating the accuracy
of the ratings and reputational data on these sites.”68 Rating
systems also risk amplifying racial and gender discrimination,69 a
concern that extends to ratings by both consumers and providers.70
62 Sharing intermediaries do create one new type of property, namely the data
that the platform collects. See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 133, 156 (2017) (describing the “de facto propertization” of the data that
users give up in exchange for access to the platform).
63 Rating systems allow both customers and providers the opportunity to exercise
their voice. This reduces the need to exit the system and induces users to behave well so they
can continue to enjoy the service in the future. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT,
VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30
(1970) (“[D]issatisfied consumers . . . , rather than just go over to the competition, can ‘kick up
a fuss’ and thereby force improved quality or service upon delinquent management.”).
64 See Adam Thierer et al., How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and
Reputational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the “Lemons Problem,” 70 U. MIAMI L. REV.
830, 873–76 (2016) (arguing that reputational rankings make regulation less necessary).
65 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THANK YOU FOR BEING LATE: AN OPTIMIST’S GUIDE TO
THRIVING IN THE AGE OF ACCELERATIONS 118 (2016) (quoting Airbnb cofounder Brian Chesky).
66 See Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory
Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 293, 316–17 (2016) (noting that reviewers are reluctant to give low ratings because
they find it unpleasant or fear retaliation and that the most satisfied customers are the
ones most likely to submit reviews).
67 See Abbey Stemler, Feedback Loop Failure: Implications for the SelfRegulation of the Sharing Economy, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 673, 688–98 (2017)
(discussing several problems exhibited by rating systems); Why Consumers Systematically
Give Inflated Grades for Poor Service, NPR: HIDDEN BRAIN (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.npr.
org/2019/01/08/683144150/why-consumers-systematically-give-inflated-grades-for-poorservice [https://perma.cc/PZW2-PUS4] (same).
68 Juliet B. Schor, Does the Sharing Economy Increase Inequality Within the
Eighty Percent?: Findings from a Qualitative Study of Platform Providers, 10 CAMBRIDGE
J. REGIONS ECON. & SOC’Y 263, 268 (2017).
69 See Arianne Renan Barzilay & Anat Ben-David, Platform Inequality: Gender
in the Gig-Economy, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 393, 427–29 (2017) (examining whether the
sharing economy has given rise to a new form of gender discrimination).
70 See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Customers,
102 IOWA L. REV. 223, 224 (2016) (“Another study . . . revealed that Airbnb guests are
willing to pay non-black hosts approximately 12% more than black hosts for comparable
properties . . . .”); Nancy Leong, New Economy, Old Biases, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2153, 2154
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However, one study found that ratings may serve to counter
stereotyping that would otherwise occur.71
Intermediaries, such as travel agents and real estate
brokers, have long existed and have been paid for their
matchmaking work. Sharing economy intermediaries similarly
receive commissions for their services, and the market leaders have
been tremendously successful.72 These companies simultaneously
amass information that can be used or sold for other purposes,
thereby “leverag[ing] pervasive connectivity in order to facilitate
trusted transactions between strangers on digital platforms.”73 As
of late 2015, the market value of Uber and Airbnb, each less than
ten years old, had climbed as high as $62.5 billion and $25.5 billion,
respectively.74 Sharing platforms are now available for a wide
range of goods and services, including home repair, cooking, usage
of tools, and arts and crafts.75 One scholar has proposed a sharing
market for the right to roam on the private land of others.76
The pervasiveness of leasehold arrangements in today’s
sharing economy reveals that today’s consumers are more
comfortable as tenants than their parents were, with rates of home
and auto ownership dropping among younger adults.77 The use of

(2016) (“[C]ertain features specific to the sharing economy actually increase the potential
racial discrimination, both in a one-off encounter and over time.”).
71 Ruomeng Cui et al., Reducing Discrimination with Reviews in the Sharing
Economy: Evidence from Field Experiments on Airbnb, MGMT. SCI., Aug. 2019, at 11,
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3273 [https://perma.cc/9JSM-RGCC] (“[W]ith a positive
review, racial discrimination is significantly attenuated: white and African American
guests receive nonstatistically distinguishable acceptance rates . . . .”).
72 They are also the source of much public fascination. One comedian has
referred to Uber as “hitchhiking with your phone.” PMMI: The Ass’n for Packaging &
Processing Techs., Sebastian Maniscalco - Uber Skit, YOUTUBE, at 0:47-0:51 (May 23,
2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t_PsVW2F6WQ [https://perma.cc/K8U8-526R].
73 Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 45, at 1670.
74 FTC, THE “SHARING” ECONOMY, supra note 49, at 12.
75 See, e.g., Services, TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/services [https://
perma.cc/BT7W-U3QE] (home contracting and repair tasks); How it Works, MEALSHARING,
https://www.mealsharing.com/how_it_works [https://perma.cc/B227-PDML] (home cooked
meals around the world).
76 See Donald J. Kochan, The Market to Roam: Using Sharing Economy Platforms
for Expanding Roaming Access to Land Resources, 59 NAT. RESOURCES J. 89, 92 (2019).
77 See Laurie S. Goodman & Christopher Mayer, Homeownership and the
American Dream, 32 J. ECON. PERSP. 31, 36 (2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/
files/publication/96221/homeownership_and_the_american_dream_0.pdf [https://perma.
cc/D8N5-L9A5] (providing homeownership data for different age groups over time);
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING
2017, at 21 (2017), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/harvard_jchs_state_
of_the_nations_housing_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/HBM5-SGA8] (discussing possible
reasons for the drop in homeownership rates among adults under thirty-five); Melissa
Etehad & Rob Nikolewski, Millennials and Car Ownership? It’s Complicated, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 23, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-millennialscars-20161223-story.html# [https://perma.cc/6GKC-PFF8] (offering a variety of reasons
why millennials are less likely than older people to purchase cars).
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leasehold terminology concedes a higher degree of transiency.78 But
it also acknowledges that more people wish to lease a greater
number of goods and services for shorter periods of time rather
than owning a smaller number of them permanently.79 Access
matters more than ownership to these consumers, who appear less
inclined to define their personhood by the assets they own.80 This
description of the platform economy presupposes two small-time
operators, such as an apartment dweller with an extra room and a
visitor who wishes to stay for a few days, along with an
intermediary that connects them.
A variation of this sharing model includes numerous users
who sporadically consume goods or services that are owned as a
fleet. Previously, rather than purchasing a car, an occasional driver
might rent one as needed on a daily or weekly basis from Hertz or
Avis.81 Today that occasional driver can pay a monthly fee to
Zipcar, which allows the member to use a vehicle as needed in
exchange for an hourly fee.82 In this setting, there is no need for a
go-between, since we are not linking two small-timers. The
provider is in the full-time business of sharing, much like a
traditional rental company, but once again with leases of shorter
duration than were common in the past. Providers such as this can
be legally structured in a variety of ways, including as corporations,
limited liability companies, partnerships, trusts, or cooperatives.83
78 See Jimmie Lenz, How Millennials Are Affecting the Price of Your Home,
CONVERSATION (May 20, 2019, 7:10 AM), https://theconversation.com/how-millennialsare-affecting-the-price-of-your-home-115830 [https://perma.cc/697X-CXX4] (“[Y]ounger
Americans are buying homes far less often than their elders’ generations did, and that
puts a large sector of the U.S. economy at risk.”).
79 See, e.g., Sam Sanders, The Affluent Homeless: A Sleeping Pod, A Hired Desk
and A Handful of Clothes, NPR (Apr. 23, 2019, 11:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/
23/715107132/the-affluent-homeless-a-sleeping-pod-a-hired-desk-and-a-handful-of-clo
thes [https://perma.cc/D5VA-F5GP].
80 Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Property Without Personhood, 47 SETON HALL L. REV.
771, 792 (2017) (“As opposed to the vision of property as shaping and reflecting personhood,
access is a choice to use without attachment. Its primary function as an alternative to
ownership is to allow fluidity and the ability to experiment.” (footnotes omitted)).
81 A newer version of this model looks more like Uber for small-time car renters, in
which an owner simply leases their owned auto to someone else, with an app serving as
intermediary. Peter Holley, Airbnb for Cars Is Here. And the Rental Car Giants Are Not
Happy, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/
2018/03/30/airbnb-for-cars-is-here-and-the-rental-car-giants-are-not-happy/?utm_term=.388
9a405d0b5 [https://perma.cc/L64J-ZS9S] (noting efforts by traditional auto rental companies
and airports to prevent the growth of these new rental models).
82 See Pricing, ZIPCAR, https://www.zipcar.com/pricing [https://perma.cc/U5G7T56J]. Shelley Kreiczer-Levy focuses on this new economy’s emphasis on access rather than
ownership. See Shelley Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, 36 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 155,
157 (2017) (“Millennials own less property than previous generations, and they prefer
flexibility, availability, and choice over the stability and permanence associated with
ownership.” (footnote omitted)).
83 Large timeshare developers such as Marriott, which previously sold weekly
slices that were similar to time-delimited condominiums, have more recently moved toward
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The term “sharing” is deceptive in one sense, for the socalled sharing economy is an anti-sharing economy in some
ways.84 People who previously would allow their friends to crash
in their spare bedroom may have evolved into home-sharing
landlords. This gives them a sharper understanding of the
precise dollar value of that room and may make them less
inclined to give it away.85 They are still sharing the bedroom in
the dictionary sense of the word, but they have a more
commodified view of their real estate and may be less inclined to
part with it gratuitously.86 At the same time, one who shares
their home with a paying stranger is more apt to form some type
of social bond with their customer than a hotel operator would.87
The sharing economy appears at first glance to be leading
to considerable disintermediation.88 Travelers, for example, can
book home-shares and ride-shares on their smartphones, greatly
reducing the need for travel agents. However, the individuals
and companies that formerly served in these roles have often
been replaced by platforms, just as yesterday’s grizzled ticket
scalper has become today’s StubHub. These new platforms profit
from their matchmaking services.89 While information is being
stored, processed, and shared more easily than in the past, it is
not clear that fewer transactions employ intermediaries.90 These

the trust and cooperative models. See Arthur O. Spaulding, Jr. et al., Time Share Today –
Will It Work for Your Project?, ACREL PAPERS, Spring 2018, at 71, 73–80 (comparing
various possible ownership structures).
84 Cf. Bronwen Morgan, The Sharing Economy, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
351, 362 (2018) (“[W]hat is at stake most centrally in sharing economy developments is
not so much the regulatory ambiguity that has resulted but the possibility of excavating
or unearthing an alternative vision of market exchange.”).
85 See Schor, supra note 68, at 264 (“A related critique is that selling slivers of
one’s life (room, car, time, attention) is a commodification of daily life that will
undermine genuine social connection and solidarity.” (citation omitted)).
86 See Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an
Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215, 267–68 (2016) (expressing concern
about the potential loss of informality and bonding benefits).
87 Id. at 267–68; see also Dyal-Chand, supra note 60, at 255 (“[A] philosophy of
social connection and reward imbues the marketing of services and products in the
sharing economy.”).
88 See Fagundes, supra note 47, at 1385–86 (suggesting that dealing directly with
service providers rather than with intermediaries may increase subjective well-being).
89 The scalper, of course, purchases the tickets and risks being unable to resell
them; the online ticket service, by contrast, is simply a listing agency that bears far lower
risk. That online intermediary may provide other services, however, such as information
about prices for other tickets to the same event, the ability to transfer tickets electronically,
and guarantees of ticket authenticity. Moreover, those who are uncomfortable negotiating
prices with experienced strangers may prefer dealing with an impersonal website. See
Stein, supra note 30, at 18–19.
90 See Cohen, supra note 62, at 135 (“[P]latforms do not enter or expand
markets; they replace (and rematerialize) them.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233919

802

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:3

newer intermediaries may disappear themselves, as blockchain
alternatives develop.91
Note that if we define our terms loosely enough, nearly
every commodity can be construed as being part of the sharing
economy. Airline tickets once again serve as a good example.
While I may fly more miles in a year than I drive, I drive most of
those miles in my own automobile while I am unlikely ever to own
a plane. In some sense, then, my United Airlines ticket is a plane
share, not terribly different from a Via share. By that rationale,
wine served by the glass in a restaurant can be denominated a
“bottle share,” with the restaurant serving as a clearinghouse for
five unrelated people who wish to purchase part of a moderately
perishable item. Similarly, buying a 2x4 at Lowe’s could be
considered a “tree share,” and so on.
My goal in this article is not to delineate the boundaries of
the sharing economy. In some sense, the very existence of a
market economy means that many commercial exchanges are
sharing transactions of a sort. But there is little doubt that certain
assets used to be considered commodities that you either owned
or did not own. Today, with the advent of smart technologies,
those same assets can be co-owned in a variety of different
manners and legal structures that previously were impractical or
unimaginable. Those who used to own may now be satisfied with
access as needed.92 And the same technology that makes this type
of collaborative consumption feasible also allows for more of these
goods and services to be priced dynamically.93
B.

Scarcity and Dynamic Pricing

One aspect of the sharing economy—dynamic pricing—is
particularly important to the question of inequality. A price is
dynamic if it reflects supply and demand at any given moment,
with the price shifting immediately upon changes in either.94
91 For example, Ridecoin turns Uber’s model “on its head by extracting the
middleman and replacing him with a decentralized cryptocurrency. By bringing ride
sharing onto the blockchain, we will allow riders and drivers to negotiate directly with
one another. This will have the effect of lowering costs while putting control back where
it belongs . . . .” Reserve Your Ridecoin Shares on Start Engine, FAIR RIDE, https://
www.fairride.com/ [https://perma.cc/2TE6-XXMH].
92 See Lee Anne Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 1496
(2016) (“Access to resources, not the ownership of things, is increasingly becoming the
coin of the realm.”).
93 See infra Section I.B.
94 See, e.g., How to Estimate a Lyft Ride’s Cost, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/e
n-us/articles/115013080308-How-to-estimate-a-Lyft-ride-s-cost [https://perma.cc/6WQEDNDR] (“[P]rices for rides are dynamically calculated based on a variety of factors
including route, time of day, ride type, number of available drivers, current demand for
rides, and any local fees or surcharges.”).
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Dynamic pricing existed long before the advent of the modern
sharing economy, most notably in securities markets. But the
technological leaps that have made the sharing economy feasible
also make dynamic pricing far more common.
Dynamic pricing may be nothing more than the pricing
system any capitalist economy would have used all along had it
been technically feasible. People have always price-shopped, but
the logistics of doing so made it more likely that someone would
shop around for a car than for the fuel to put in its tank. Now,
your navigation app can tell you the price at every nearby gas
station and you can decide how far out of your way you are
willing to travel to save a few cents per gallon. Prices find their
equilibrium more rapidly and accurately than in the past, and
shoppers have quicker access to more complete data.95
Sharing and dynamic pricing need not occur together, but
they often go hand-in-hand and there has been a recent uptick in the
prevalence of both. Dynamic pricing can exist without sharing, as
the airline ticket illustration demonstrates.96 Similarly, sharing can
exist without dynamic pricing: Home shares are typically listed at a
fixed price that does not change very much with demand.97 However,
sharing platforms often employ dynamic pricing. As a result, surge
pricing is increasingly used for products that previously had fixed
prices.98 Uber uses surge pricing even though taxi services typically
do not, despite the fact that the two services are largely
95 One app examines prices on offer from competing ride-sharing companies so
that a user can comparison-shop without using multiple apps. Mark Stricherz, Yay Yo
Plans $50 Million Offer for All-in-One Ride-Hailing Services App, CQ ROLL CALL (Dec.
22, 2016), 2016 WL 7404179 (“Its app will be the ‘first single-sign-on solution for the
growing ride-sharing and transportation economy,’ the ride-and-limousine sharing
equivalent to Kayak.com for hotels, flights and cars, according to the [SEC] filing.”). This
should lead to meta-dynamic pricing, as dynamically-priced Uber adjusts its prices to
compete with dynamically-priced Lyft.
96 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
97 The owner is free to lower the price as the date approaches, to entice
prospective users before the good expires and can no longer be sold. But home-sharing
rates usually do not change by the minute, in contrast with ride-sharing rates. In
addition, popular seasons may cost more than other times of the year, but those price
differentials are posted in advance and may not vary much after that. In fact, one online
coach suggests that more Airbnb landlords shift to a dynamic pricing model. Nathan
Rice, 5 Things Airbnb Hosts Need to Know About Dynamic Pricing, AIRBNB COURSE (Jan.
7, 2019), https://theairbnbcourse.com/5-things-airbnb-hosts-need-to-know-about-dynami
c-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/R3DP-WW3G].
98 Ride-share customers probably make their decisions based largely on price.
Ride shares are more fungible than home shares, and the purchaser of a ride share is
unlikely to inspect the vehicle before summoning the car, most likely reasoning that one
ride—unlike one beach rental—is as good as another. Ride-sharing companies do,
however, provide drivers and prospective purchasers with user reviews of each other,
unlike medallion taxi services. See, e.g., How to Use the Uber App, UBER, https://www.ub
er.com/about/how-does-uber-work/ [https://perma.cc/3WYH-T6G9] (“At the end of each
trip, drivers and riders can rate each other from 1 to 5 stars. Riders also have the option
to give the driver compliments and a tip directly in the app.”).
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interchangeable.99 The same technological developments that make
sharing more popular also make dynamic pricing more feasible.100
Moreover, a chief focus of this article is goods that are
both scarce and necessary.101 As the platform economy matures
and continues to employ dynamic pricing, more and more scarce
goods likely will be surge-priced, with cost serving as the signal
that separates purchasers from non-purchasers. The pricing of
these products will become more volatile and less predictable: It
is harder to know the price of a commodity that changes every
minute than one that changes every week. Purchasing decisions
thus will become more challenging, particularly for those with
constrained resources.
Some commodities, such as securities traded on financial
markets, have long been priced dynamically. Centuries before
computer algorithms and smartphones became widespread,
human traders devised sophisticated dynamic pricing techniques
for these transactions, including transfers of shares and trading in
options and futures. These markets allowed for easy interaction
between strangers and also provided opportunities for hedging and
insurance. Once again, technology has expanded what can be
accomplished. Yesterday’s shouting traders have been replaced by
automated trading programs that execute transactions in
milliseconds, which means that trading volumes can be much
higher than in the past.102 And the range of goods and services that
are bought and sold in this manner has expanded rapidly and has
transitioned from fungible commodities, such as corporate shares,
to more unique services, such as a ride from Point A to Point B.
It is easy to see how that model could grow further in the
sharing economy. A farmer has long been able to sell October
wheat on a futures market during the prior March, to avoid
potentially devastating price uncertainty and to know that the
sale price will be adequate to repay crop production financing.103
Now, a rider could potentially purchase an Uber ride in advance
through a ride-sharing futures app or through Uber itself.
Rather than worrying that rain or heavy demand could cause
the price of a ride to increase just when she needs it, the user of
“Uber future” could purchase the ride now, at a fixed price that
presumably includes the estimated future price plus a small
See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text.
See Ziobro, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
101 See infra Section II.A.
102 MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT 9–10 (2014)
(calculating the trading value of a millisecond).
103 See CHICAGO SRW WHEAT FUTURES QUOTES, CME GROUP, https://www.cmegro
up.com/trading/agricultural/grain-and-oilseed/wheat.html [https://perma.cc/XF3X-GLEE].
99

100
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insurance premium. The passenger commits to paying that price
now, knowing that if prices later increase, she has locked in the
lower cost.104 The driver knows that he has a committed
passenger at that hour, even though the price may prove to be
lower than he otherwise might have commanded. The sharing
economy benefits many people in a variety of ways, which helps
to explain its recent rapid growth.105
C.

How the Benefits of the Sharing Economy Explain Its
Growth to Date and Its Likely Future Expansion

There are obvious technological reasons why the platform
economy has been able to grow so rapidly during the past decade.
But market participants have also become more comfortable
with occupancy and use rights of shorter duration. Automobile
owners familiar with renting a car while traveling can readily
comprehend using a Zipcar for an hour.106 This seems to be
particularly true for younger consumers, who may be the earliest
adopters of the necessary technology.107
The platform economy also allows for lifestyle
improvements, both for the short-term landlord and the shortterm tenant. It is now feasible for two or more people to share
the ownership of costly assets such as motor vehicles through a
variety of different legal structures. A commuter who needs an
auto only occasionally may be better off hiring an Uber driver
sporadically than owning a car that spends most of its time
parked. A prospective car buyer who cannot quite swing the
monthly payment may finally be able to take the leap or afford
a higher-quality auto by working as an Uber driver two
weekends per month. Neither of these drivers may need or be
104 Even if the price does not look like a bargain, the purchaser locks in that
price and avoids volatility and uncertainty.
105 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 62 (8th ed.
2011) (discussing the functions of a futures market).
106 Sadly, some users employ sharing economy assets as low-cost alternatives to
costly necessities. See, e.g., Austin Frakt, Uber, Lyft and the Urgency of Saving Money on
Ambulances, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/upshot/uberlyft-and-the-urgency-of-saving-money-on-ambulances.html [https://perma.cc/STW6-C5RH]
(noting how some people now use ride-sharing services as cheaper alternatives to
ambulances). But see BILL BROWDER, RED NOTICE 96 (2015) (“I soon learned that an
ambulance stopping to pick up a fare in Moscow wasn’t unusual. Every vehicle was a potential
taxi . . . . [E]veryone was so desperate for money that any and all would take fares.”).
107 See, e.g., GOLDMAN SACHS ASSET MGMT., INVESTING IN THE MILLENNIAL
EFFECT 2 (Sept. 2016), https://www.gsam.com/content/dam/gsam/pdfs/common/en/publi
c/articles/global-equity-outlook/investing-in-the-millennial-effect.pdf?sa=n&rd=n
[https://perma.cc/SYD2-R4GJ] (“Many Millennials have shown a preference for access
over ownership. This is in stark contrast to prior generations, who were more focused on
home and auto ownership.”).
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able to afford one hundred percent of a car, but the sharing
platform allows them to split the cost and benefit of one vehicle,
perhaps unequally, to the advantage of both.
The sharing economy thus allows market participants to
acquire smaller and smaller slices of more and more goods,
accessing these assets when needed rather than owning them.
Instead of building a new bedroom but having to forego a car, the
market participant who desires each commodity some of the time
may be able to afford both by collaboratively consuming each of
them on a shared basis. This access-as-needed model might have
developed even without dynamic pricing, but the same algorithms
that facilitate the dispersed ownership of costly assets also allow
for the dynamic pricing of ownership slices. Price-conscious
consumers can buy or sell only when they like the price.
These sharing arrangements also reduce waste and help
the environment, at least in some cases. The two market
participants just described may now require the manufacture of
one car instead of two, which will lead to reductions in auto
manufacturing, and perhaps fuel consumption, traffic, and total
vehicle use.108 Thus, as more people share ownership of goods in
different ways, consumers of more modest means are able to
enjoy goods and services they previously could not, and the
environment may also benefit.109
It is probable that a steadily increasing number of goods
and services will be priced in the future in the same way that
airline tickets are priced today, with algorithms pairing up

108 If two parties share the ownership of a vehicle in the manner described, then
they consume only half the raw materials they would have needed to produce two cars, at
least initially. But this may or may not reduce the actual number of miles driven, so it is
more difficult to predict whether fuel consumption and road traffic will drop. If it turns out
that each co-owner drives the same number of miles they would have driven had they each
owned a car, then total fuel consumption and road traffic remain the same, though they
may be redistributed to off-peak times of day. Moreover, if the vehicle lasts the same
number of road miles, it will need to be replaced sooner that it would have if the two owners
had each bought their own car at the outset. More likely, though, the co-owners will save
or pool resources at least some of the time—perhaps by driving together, perhaps by
foregoing a ride altogether when the other co-owner is using the vehicle—and the sharing
arrangement will result in some reduction in negative environmental impact.
109 One can imagine an economy that develops in the opposite direction, with
common ownership evolving into short-term leasehold arrangements and then gradually
toward fee simple ownership. A farmer on a collective is permitted to retain a portion of
this year’s crops for personal use or sale, then later is allowed to rent a small plot for a
growing season, and later still is permitted to rent land for a longer term or buy it in fee
simple. That imaginary economy is not terribly different from that of post-1949 China,
which, from a very different starting point, has come more and more to resemble modern
Western economies. This is a move from collective ownership toward sharing, reaching
the same destination from the other direction. See GREGORY M. STEIN, MODERN CHINESE
REAL ESTATE LAW: PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT IN AN EVOLVING LEGAL SYSTEM 1–23 (2012)
(providing a summary of the background and history of Chinese real estate law).
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buyers and sellers at constantly shifting prices.110 These
computer programs will also retain masses of information about
their customers and will use this information to become
increasingly predictive. Amazon already pairs its products with
related merchandise that prior purchasers have also bought, a
feature poised to expand greatly and become more personalized.
An increasing variety of items will be priced a la carte.
Sellers may establish a base price, as airlines do for a basic seat,
and offer numerous optional add-ons, such as checked baggage
and extra legroom.111 Prices for stripped-down versions of basic
commodities could drop, while more luxurious alternatives will
become increasingly costly for those willing and able to pay. End
prices will become more disguised.112
More ominously, algorithms are only as good as the
people who write their code.113 If the seller or the intermediary
has more information than the buyer, that information may be
used to disadvantage the buyer.114 This has always been true on
a gross scale, but now prices may vary depending on the identity
of the shopper and her personal history, as algorithms become
more capable of assessing a particular buyer’s level of necessity
and ability to pay.115 Different Uber riders may pay different
amounts for similar rides at the same time, a practice known as
110 This article intentionally leaves for another day and another author any
discussion of items protected by government-sanctioned monopolies, such as the patents
that protect pharmaceutical products.
111 This arguably lowers the quality of the basic service, which “must be
sufficiently degraded in order to make people want to pay to escape it.” Tim Wu, Why
Airlines Want to Make You Suffer, NEW YORKER (Dec. 26, 2014), https://www.newyorker.
com/business/currency/airlines-want-you-to-suffer [https://perma.cc/EN2V-4KGB].
112 See Leslie Josephs, Airlines’ $57 Billion Question: Is There Anything Left to
Charge Passengers For?, CNBC (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/06/airline
s-raise-baggage-change-and-seating-fees-as-fuel-prices-surge.html [https://perma.cc/3M
AA-ZJGM] (noting that revenue from ancillary fees has more than doubled since 2010).
113 See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 223 (2016) (“Algorithmic processes embed values
and ethics just as much as any human process; they only seem cleaner because they’re better
at hiding that fact.”).
114 See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 45, at 1633 (“[T]he advantages of information
and power that platforms like Uber possess over participants merit a deeper response from
consumer protection law.”); id. at 1651 (“[W]hereas traditional marketers have been
content to use what they know about consumers to match them with goods and services
they might prefer, firms are increasingly using what they know to better persuade
consumers—a practice known as persuasion profiling.”).
115 See, e.g., AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP:
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 77–81 (2016) (discussing price
discrimination); Marshall Allen, Health Insurers Are Vacuuming Up Details About You—and
It Could Raise Your Rates, PROPUBLICA (July 17, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/
article/health-insurers-are-vacuuming-up-details-about-you-and-it-could-raise-your-rates
[https://perma.cc/6V8P-ATZ2] (describing “[a] future in which everything you do—the things
you buy, the food you eat, the time you spend watching TV—may help determine how much
you pay for health insurance”).
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dynamic price discrimination.116 If an algorithm can access your
bank balance from your prior bill-paying activity and knows when
your mother’s seventy-fifth birthday will occur from your recent
search for gifts, it can boost the price of your airline ticket
accordingly.117 Similarly, an algorithm can factor in where a
consumer is physically located, much as some chain stores might
charge higher prices in lower-income neighborhoods, where
residents have fewer transportation options.118 If the algorithm is
linked to a competing vendor’s algorithm, the two may collude.119
Much of the information that any algorithm possesses is
proprietary.120 This means that negotiations among market
participants and government bodies could be based on unequal
information.121 It will be difficult for governments to adopt
appropriate regulations if they are operating with incomplete
data.122 “Online businesses influence consumer behaviour by
116 Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 45, at 1658–59 (noting that there may be
innocent technical explanations for these discrepancies).
117 “If it seems like someone might be willing to pay more than the reserve price,
it makes sense to charge them more than someone who is careful about what they spend.”
Arwa Mahdawi, Is Your Friend Getting a Cheaper Uber Fare than You Are?, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/13/uber-lyft-pricespersonalized-data [https://perma.cc/LES4-4EWK]. The article also notes that a behavioral
scientist working for Uber determined that people with low phone batteries are willing to
pay higher fares for rides. Other factors relevant to pricing “include the sort of credit card
you use, where you live, the make of phone you’re using, and your ride history.” Id.
118 This example does not constitute dynamic price discrimination, in that it
does not focus on the particular purchaser, but merely differential pricing. But see
Stefano DellaVigna & Matthew Gentzkow, Uniform Pricing in US Retail Chains 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23996, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w23996?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw [https://perma.cc/
WS3T-2YSE] (arguing that retail chains employ uniform pricing from store to store even
in settings in which they might vary prices based on differing consumer demographics
and local levels of competition).
119 See Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion:
When Computers Inhibit Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775, 1781–96 (describing
four ways in which algorithms may collude).
120 See Teresa Scassa, Sharing Data in the Platform Economy: A Public Interest
Argument for Access to Platform Data, 50 U.B.C. L. REV. 1017, 1046 (2017) (noting that
information gathered by sharing economy companies “are private, commercial data, and
their ‘owners’ are justified in controlling who can access it and on what terms. Yet, . . . these
are data about activities that have significant public impacts, and that rely upon
business models that facilitate the evasion of existing regulatory frameworks”); cf.
Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3355776 [https://perma.cc/UR6UC7Z2] (arguing for the use of the Freedom of Information Act and the First Amendment
in cases involving algorithms used by government entities).
121 See O’NEIL, supra note 113, at 231 (noting “a more general trend in which
data is privately owned and privately used to private ends of profit and influence, while
the public is shut out of the process and told to behave well and trust the algorithms”);
Schor, supra note 68, at 265, 277 n.1 (describing ways in which Airbnb and other
platforms attempted to interfere with the author’s interviews of service providers).
122 See, e.g., Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing
Economy, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147, 155 (2016) (“[E]conomists have long noted the
importance of information to effective regulation.”).
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means of a wide range of technologies that determine what
information is displayed and how and when it is displayed.”123 This
may lead one to question the validity of any contract that results.124
At the furthest extreme, it is always possible that the sharing
economy will fail financially, if the business model pursued by
companies such as Uber is not viable over the long term.125
II.

DISTINCTIONS WITHIN THE SHARING ECONOMY

As the previous Part demonstrated, goods and services (or,
more generically, “commodities”) may be shared and priced
dynamically.126 But different types of goods and services raise
different fairness issues. This Part will distinguish among different
varieties of commodities in an effort to determine which kinds raise
particularly strong equity concerns. If the sharing economy turns
out to increase inequality, some aspects of that increased
inequality may be more worrisome than others.
In particular, this Part will distinguish between
necessities and luxuries, between elastic items and inelastic
items, and between public and private goods. Goods and services
can fall in one place along one matrix and in a different place
along another. For example, housing is an inelastic necessity that
is largely provided by the private sector.127 By contrast,
transportation is a somewhat elastic128 necessity that is funded to
a significant degree by the public.129 Even within a single pairing,
123 See Eliza Mik, The Erosion of Autonomy in Online Consumer Transactions,
8 LAW INNOVATION & TECH. 1, 2 (2016).
124 Id. at 3.
125 See, e.g., Hubert Horan, Will the Growth of Uber Increase Economic Welfare?,
44 TRANSP. L.J. 33, 64–66, 102–05 (2017) (arguing that the business model pursued by
Uber is not sustainable unless the company monopolizes its market, reduces payments
to drivers, and raises prices to passengers).
126 See Elvy, supra note 1, at 104–24.
127 During the 2014-18 period, there were 119,730,128 households in the United
States, and 63.8% of housing units were owner-occupied. Quick Facts: United States, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/HSD410217 [https://pe
rma.cc/9XN5-C489]. In 2018, just under one million households lived in federal public
housing and just under four million more received federal rental assistance. United
States Federal Rental Assistance Fact Sheets, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Dec.
10, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/federal-rental-assistance-fact-sheets#
US [https://perma.cc/77NW-T987].
128 Motor vehicles are elastic. Manufacturers or common carriers can usually
increase capacity, and someone who needs to purchase a car or a plane ticket on short
notice can typically do so. Roadway infrastructure, by contrast, is inelastic. Thus, if there
is an auto shortage, manufacturers can quickly fabricate more, but even a relatively
simple repaving project can take months. For a classic story of the inelasticity of highway
construction, see the Massachusetts state government webpage describing the history of
Boston’s “Big Dig,” The Big Dig: Project Background, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/
info-details/the-big-dig-project-background [https://perma.cc/K2DA-9EKK].
129 Government funds a large portion of the cost of public transit. See CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R42706, FEDERAL PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM: IN BRIEF 4 (2020),
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such as necessities versus luxuries, particular goods and services
do not necessarily fall at a fixed spot: Transportation to work is
more essential than transportation to a vacation, while
transportation to the emergency room is the most essential of the
three. In addition, transportation may be more of a concern in
thinly populated areas, where the distances to be traveled are
greater and alternatives such as buses and trains are less
plentiful. Thus, transportation may be more of a necessity in some
settings than in others, and placing a commodity along any of
these three spectra can be highly contextual.
The point of this exercise is to determine the types of goods
and services most likely to raise significant fairness issues and the
specific settings in which they are most likely to raise those concerns.
By focusing on particular commodities in particular scenarios, as
opposed to all goods and services as an undifferentiated group, this
Part will highlight the types of goods and services that raise the
greatest concern that the rise of the sharing economy will increase
inequality. If public or private intervention is warranted, these are
the specific commodities for which such involvement may be most
needed and the precise situations in which intervention may be the
most essential.
A.

Necessities Versus Luxuries

Commodities such as food, water, and health care are
essential to life, and governments often take steps to ensure
greater access to these items for all, no matter what an
individual’s financial status. Other goods may be important but
not, strictly speaking, necessary. Housing may fall into this
category, as it is possible to survive without it, just as early
humans did. In today’s modern economy, though, housing is a
near-necessity, and those who are homeless certainly enjoy
fewer opportunities and a far lower quality of life.
Other goods are necessities in some contexts but not
others: Education in basic literacy is nearly essential to survival
in today’s economy, while a Juris Doctorate may be required for
a legal career in most states but is completely unnecessary—
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42706.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D7M-PVXQ] (presenting chart
showing that user fares and other income covered only 25.9% of the total cost of public
transportation in 2017, with federal, state, and local governments providing the balance).
For private auto transit, the subsidies are less transparent, including items such as the
cost of constructing and maintaining roadways and subsidies to auto manufacturers and
energy producers. See, e.g., Morgan Scarboro & Joseph Bishop-Henchman, How Are Your
State’s Roads Funded?, TAX FOUND. (July 13, 2017), https://taxfoundation.org/state-roadfunding-infrastructure-2017 [https://perma.cc/M2P2-JLZ8] (indicating sources of road
funding on a state-by-state basis).
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some might say antithetical!—to basic survival.130 A
transcontinental air flight may be a luxury if you want to take a
vacation but a necessity to receive emergency medical treatment
or to attend a family member’s funeral. Internet access is a nearnecessity when required as part of one’s job but considerably less
so for playing Fortnite. Other commodities are necessities for
some and completely unnecessary for others: One person may
not need insulin, while their neighbor will die without it, and a
functioning heating system is far more indispensable in Alaska
than in Hawaii. Still other items are highly desirable to one
degree or another, though not strictly necessary. The human
race survived before the invention of air conditioning, cable
television, and smartphones, but the absence of these
commodities today places those who lack them at a competitive
disadvantage in other aspects of their lives, such as obtaining a
better job, and will certainly make their lives less pleasant.
In addition, some commodities transition from one level
of necessity to another over time. Landlines went from nonexistent, to oddities, to luxury goods, and then to nearnecessities in the space of just a few decades. They will likely
return to non-existent in the coming years, just as substitutes
for them become near-necessities. And others, such as reading
glasses or mobility-assistance devices, may be necessities only at
certain stages during one’s life.
In short, some goods are necessities, others are extremely
important to survival without technically being necessary to it,
and others are relatively less important. Some goods may be
essential to a higher lifestyle quality without being strictly
necessary to survival. Some commodities may be necessities for
some people but not others, while other goods and services may
be necessary in some contexts or locations but not in others.
During the course of a person’s life, a commodity may be
necessary at some points but not others. Thus, even if we can
agree on a definition for the term “necessity,” it is evident that
goods and services are arrayed at various points along a spectrum
and do not stay fixed in one place for all people at all times.

130 See, e.g., Moriah Balingit, Do Children Have a Right to Literacy? Attorneys
Are Testing that Question, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/education/do-children-have-a-right-to-literacy-attorneys-are-testing-that-ques
tion/2018/08/13/926d0016-9042-11e8-8322-b5482bf5e0f5_story.html?utm_term=.0d05
1d783275 [https://perma.cc/ABA8-CUVB] (discussing a federal judge’s holding that there
is no constitutional right to “a defined, minimum level of education by which [a] child
can attain literacy”).
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If we distribute scarce necessities solely on the basis of
price, some people cannot afford them.131 But the person who lacks
a true necessity will, by definition, be unable to survive without
it. Someone must supply the difference between the price of a
necessity and the maximum amount the poorest consumers can
afford or must drive the price down by producing more of the
commodity.132 In some cases, charities strive to make up this
difference. But charities cannot meet all of this need themselves,
they suffer from coordination problems, and they may insist that
donees meet requirements—such as membership in a particular
religious faith—that some needy recipients are unwilling to meet.
That leaves other private actors or the government to fill the
remaining gap. For some necessities, government does indeed
strive to plug this hole.133
Governments that seek to address shortages such as
these can supply the goods themselves or can subsidize supply
or demand. A government may decide to provide necessities or
near-necessities at a loss, as with public housing. It may ensure
that these goods can be purchased at a lower cost by providing
direct subsidies, tax benefits, or zoning bonuses to those who
supply them and requiring those suppliers to pass their savings
along to qualifying consumers. Or a government may offer direct
or indirect financial support on the demand side, in the form of
cash or vouchers to needy consumers. These subsidies and
payments are nothing more than transfers, with more affluent
taxpayers contributing funding to support those less able to
provide for their own needs.134
If the government believes that everyone should be able to
enjoy necessary commodities or should be required to purchase
these items because they are essential to themselves or others, it
may impose mandates in parallel with subsidies. Thus, wageearners are required to contribute toward their retirement,
drivers in many states must maintain minimum levels of
automobile insurance, and many people of modest means receive
only partial government subsidies for the cost of their basic
nutrition, shelter, and health care. This approach also reduces
131 For an interesting and worrisome recent proposal, see Rebecca Beitsch,
Cranking Up the Cost: States Consider ‘Surge Pricing’ for Power, GOVERNING (Feb. 19,
2019), https://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/sl-states-powersurge-pricing.html [https://perma.cc/62V9-DJ67].
132 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 36 (1988)
(discussing the interactions among supply, demand, and price).
133 See infra Section IV.B.1.
134 This discussion can be extended to other expenses. See, e.g., Alec Schierenbeck,
The Constitutionality of Income-Based Fines, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1869, 1870–71 (2018)
(arguing that low-income offenders should pay lower fines than higher-income offenders).
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moral hazard by preventing those who need or benefit from any
particular program from fully externalizing the cost.135
This is not to suggest that the government subsidizes or
mandates only necessities or that every necessity is subsidized
or mandated. Many Americans were forced to live without
health insurance—and thus often without necessary health
care—until recently, and a sizable number still do.136 Moreover,
the decision to expand health care coverage and guarantees
during the Obama administration was and remains a heavily
contested political issue. The uproar surrounding these policies
will certainly discourage similar types of subsidy in the future.
In addition, some approaches are more effective in meeting
demand than others. But the federal and state governments,
along with many non-governmental organizations, recognize in
varying ways that some essential items should not be allocated
purely on the basis of their free-market price.
As dynamic pricing becomes more prevalent, prices will
become more volatile, shortages will cause the price of necessities
to rise, and the gap between the market price and the maximum
amount a needy consumer can afford may grow, especially at
times of peak demand. With prices more quickly reflecting the
constantly changing intersection between supply and demand
curves, some buyers will discover that, just as they need a good
most, its price peaks: In fact, that is how dynamic pricing is
supposed to work. Even those consumers who can afford the
commodity when they need it may not know that in advance. They
may forego the item in the incorrect belief they cannot afford it,
and they will experience higher levels of stress and uncertainty
even if they ultimately obtain the item.
This usually proves to be a short-term problem, as the
shortage induces prospective suppliers to provide more of the
good and the shortage self-corrects. This assumes that the good
is available, fails to reduce the suffering of those who must do
without until the shortage is alleviated, and does nothing to
ensure that everyone will be able to afford the new, somewhat
lower equilibrium price. Even a temporary shortage may prove
to be life-threateningly long in the case of true necessities such
as potable water and food.
In these settings, the question becomes how to ration
necessities until there is adequate quantity to meet demand. If
See infra Part IV.
“In 2018, 8.5 percent of people, or 27.5 million, did not have health insurance
at any point during the year.” EDWARD R. BERCHICK ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60267, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2018, at 2 (Nov. 2019).
135
136
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prices adjust rapidly and dynamically, it is the least affluent
members of society who will be unable to obtain essential
commodities in the short run. Expanded use of dynamic pricing
suggests that this combination of events will occur more
frequently. When the market is under the greatest stress, the
least affluent consumers will go without.
B.

Elastic Versus Inelastic Goods and Services

Some goods are highly elastic, meaning that they (or close
substitutes) can be supplied in greater quantities fairly quickly
and easily.137 Food and transportation often fall into this category,
though not always.138 Other goods are highly inelastic: Backup
supplies are limited, there are few adequate substitutes, and
obtaining more product will be slow, costly, or both. A housing
shortage following a hurricane can be alleviated, but tarps, tents,
and manufactured housing may have to suffice for years until
permanent units slowly come online. If an earthquake collapses
an essential roadway or bridge, auto traffic may have to take
lengthy detours or be unable to reach destinations that previously
were accessible.139
The fact that a good is inelastic does not inevitably imply
that it is a necessity: Some non-essential goods simply lack ready
substitutes. The price of the grain quinoa has increased in recent
years as its health benefits have become more widely understood,
but quinoa is difficult to grow in large quantities.140 Most
Americans can live quite fulfilling lives without consuming
137 “Elasticity of demand is a numerical measure of how responsive demand is
to changes in price.” COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 29.
138 If an area experiences a temporary food shortage, supplies can often be
shipped in from elsewhere. If a rainstorm causes a run on taxis, subways and buses may
be able to fill the gap.
139 A huge natural disaster that disrupts supply chains may lead to prolonged
insufficiencies of inelastic goods and services that will be difficult to remediate, as
residents of Puerto Rico learned after Hurricane Maria. See, e.g., Katie Zezima, FEMA
to Stop Distributing Emergency Food and Water to Puerto Rico, WASH. POST (Jan. 31,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/fema-to-stop-distributing-emergencyfood-and-water-to-puerto-rico/2018/01/30/e851e7b4-0602-11e8-8777-2a059f168dd2_stor
y.html?utm_term=.5c75fd1cbf46 [https://perma.cc/3TGB-YP53] (“The announcement
angered many who said they believe FEMA has not provided a sufficient response to an
island where about one-third of residents still lack power and, in rural areas, have
difficulty obtaining clean water and food.”).
140 Lydia DePillis, Quinoa Should Be Taking Over the World. This Is Why It
Isn’t, WASH. POST (July 11, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013
/07/11/quinoa-should-be-taking-over-the-world-this-is-why-it-isnt/?utm_term=.42ece190
3223 [https://perma.cc/85J4-ET2T]; see also Beth Goulart, Why Pecan Pies Have Gotten
So Expensive: It’s China’s Fault, SLATE (Nov. 26, 2013), https://slate.com/human-interes
t/2013/11/pecan-prices-why-chinas-demand-has-made-thanksgiving-pies-more-expensiv
e.html [https://perma.cc/8JX5-KPLJ] (observing how Chinese demand has driven up the
price for American pecans).
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quinoa, as most did until a few years ago, and those who cannot
afford this suddenly expensive grain likely will continue to
survive by eating something else. Production is inelastic, but the
good is not essential. Similarly, the fact that an elastic good can
be procured or substituted rapidly does not always suggest that it
is a luxury item. Many food items are essential but easy to supply
in greater quantities when needed, and the market promptly
alleviates shortages.
If demand for an inelastic good rises and stays high,
prices will remain elevated because, by definition, new supplies
or satisfactory substitutes cannot be provided quickly.141 By
comparison, if demand for a more elastic good increases, new
supplies will quickly become available, or consumers will make
do with the next-best thing.142 The price may climb briefly, but
the high elasticity means that supply will increase promptly and
the price will fall back.
Thus, dynamic pricing has a self-correcting effect on the
supply of highly elastic goods, and shortages and price surges
will be short-lived. By contrast, dynamic pricing will have a far
greater impact on the cost of inelastic goods. If demand increases
and supply cannot, then the dynamic price shoots up and
remains high. The price immediately tells the market to supply
more of the commodity, but inelasticity means that new supply
cannot meet the heightened demand. Moreover, if demand is
generally erratic, prospective suppliers may be unwilling to
undertake the long-term investment needed to provide higher
quantities down the road. Those who need the product will
endure high prices and considerable inconvenience.
If a shortage arises in a market with many off-duty Uber
drivers, that may induce some drivers to give up leisure time—
suddenly more costly in terms of foregone income—to transport
passengers who are now prepared to pay higher prices.143 Drivers
of fixed-fare taxis will not be similarly induced, since they do not
earn a thunderstorm premium, and the shortage will persist until
the skies clear. The windfall for the Uber drivers, however, will be
temporary, as the rising supply of drivers causes prices to slide
back down until the supply and demand curves again reach

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 29–32.
Id.
143 See James Surowiecki, In Praise of Efficient Price Gouging, MIT TECH. REV.
(Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/529961/in-praise-of-efficient-pricegouging/ [https://perma.cc/J3WG-P24Y] (quoting an Uber board member who noted that
“when Uber first tested dynamic pricing in Boston in 2012, it was able to ‘increase onthe-road supply of drivers by 70 to 80 percent’”).
141
142
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equilibrium.144 Because the supply of ride-sharing drivers is elastic,
supply, and then price, respond quickly when demand increases.145
Contrast what happens if Interstate 66 outside of
Washington, D.C., backs up during rush hour. A new road cannot
suddenly appear. Demand will exceed supply, driving speeds will
drop, and trips will take longer. There may be alternate routes or
methods of transport, but those substitutes can probably absorb
only a small part of the excess demand. Some drivers may search
for less adequate substitutes, such as an earlier departure time or
a teleconference in lieu of a face-to-face meeting. But if you need
to get to or from Washington during rush hour, you have few
options. This is why the Virginia Department of Transportation’s
experiment with dynamic pricing for single-occupant vehicles on
that road has led to prices that have gone as high as $47.50 for an
auto trip of just ten miles.146 The commodity—space on a crowded
highway—is inelastic, and a surge in demand means that demand
will exceed supply, supply cannot increase accordingly, and the
direct or in-kind cost must rise.
As with necessity, elasticity is relative and depends on
factors such as the existence of adequate substitutes. If you
consider wheat to be an adequate substitute for quinoa, then you
are in luck, as wheat is plentiful and cheap. If you must have
quinoa and wheat simply will not do, then wheat is not a substitute
and you must pay the higher price for quinoa or seek out a third
grain. Similarly, a mid-sized city may see its housing stock increase
every year by a few hundred units. That is sufficiently elastic when

144 Airbnb lodgings are far more elastic than hotel rooms. A dwelling owner may
decide to make the unit available only at peak times, when the high price makes it
worthwhile, while a hotel ordinarily makes all rooms available on all nights. Thus, shared
rooms can serve as a safety valve, providing extra capacity and dampening prices when
demand is highest. See Chiara Farronato & Andrey Fradkin, The Welfare Effects of Peer
Entry in the Accommodation Market: The Case of Airbnb 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 24361, 2018) (“We validate this prediction by estimating a peer supply
elasticity that is twice as high as hotels’ elasticity.”).
145 This may be less true for extremely long trips, which tend to be less costly per
mile. BlaBlaCar offers a long-distance ride-sharing service in a number of countries outside
of the United States. Click. Go. Together, BLABLACAR, https://www.blablacar.com/ [https:/
/perma.cc/JTZ2-ZJCD]. See generally Benjamin Kemper, Blablacar Is the Ride-Sharing
App We Wish We Had in the U.S., CONDE NAST TRAVELER (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.
cntraveler.com/story/blablacar-is-the-ride-sharing-app-we-wish-we-had-in-the-us [https://
perma.cc/VRE2-FC96] (“Blablacar, a French company that’s been around since 2006, is a
ride-share app that lets you carpool with someone traveling from, say, Madrid to San
Sebastián or Mexico City to Oaxaca.”); id. (“Blablacar prevents its drivers from making a
profit by imposing strict limits on pricing.”).
146 See Luz Lazo, Virginia to Tweak 66 Express Lanes Pricing to Address Tolls
that Have Topped $47, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/trafficandcommuting/virginia-to-tweak-66-express-lanes-pricing-to-address-tollsthat-have-topped-47/2018/04/30/70441ab8-4c88-11e8-84a0-458a1aa9ac0a_story.html?
utm_term=.58edbb2c97fc [https://perma.cc/5JKF-5AHF].
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population is increasing slowly but not if a hurricane suddenly
destroys or damages thousands of existing units.147
In addition, the elasticity of an item may change. If demand
for automobiles swells unexpectedly, factories add third shifts to
increase supply. But if the factory reaches peak capacity, or the
skilled labor force is exhausted, or a necessary component is in
short supply, or a trade war develops without warning, the
elasticity of auto production can drop suddenly and the shortage
will persist longer. Building a new factory or training additional
skilled workers takes more time.
Inelastic goods do not necessarily exhibit volatile prices.
Their prices may increase and remain high. In fact, their very
inelasticity may reduce demand, and thus price. People
considering moving to New York or San Francisco know that
residential rental units are extremely costly and that increases
in supply are highly constrained, a fact that may shift their focus
to lower-rent cities. This, in turn, may slow further price
increases in these already popular cities. Rents may increase
steadily, but barring outside shocks, they are unlikely to jump
up without warning. The very inelasticity of the product may
serve to inhibit demand and moderate volatility.
C.

Public Versus Private Goods and Services

Some goods and services are provided exclusively or
primarily by the public sector. In some cases, there is no realistic
alternative, as with the case of comprehensive national defense,
the interstate highway system and the infrastructure for railway,
shipping, and air travel. In other cases, there are economies of
scale to collective provision of certain services. It might be
possible for each user to generate a personal supply of electricity
and water, but government entities (or heavily regulated private
or quasi-private utilities) can provide plentiful, reliable, and less
costly service.
The government may mandate participation in a national
system to avoid free-rider problems. Social Security, health care,
poverty-reduction programs, transportation, and national defense
all fall into this category to some degree.148 In other settings, such
as education and the national park system, the commodity is a
147 See, e.g., Jim Turner, Florida Hurricane Damage Tops $1.5 Billion, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/weather/hurricane/os-hurricanedamage-20161216-story.html [https://perma.cc/F75D-UK5Z] (detailing Florida damage figures
for hurricanes during one season).
148 See POSNER, supra note 105, at 640 (“Whenever there are free-rider problems
there is an economic argument for government intervention . . . .”).
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worthy but money-losing proposition, and the government
subsidizes the provision of the good for the general public welfare.
Many people view types of goods and services as a public
trust, in which the government provides the good or performs
the service as a trustee on behalf of all citizens.149 Educating
children and protecting unique places are viewed as important
functions that should not be entrusted entirely to private
entities. The government serves in a fiduciary capacity when it
supplies these commodities.
Most goods and services in the United States, however, are
provided by private entities. For instance, most entertainment
venues—national parks aside—are privately owned and controlled.
There is likely to be only minimal backlash if Disney, a for-profit
business with legal duties to its shareholders, raises admissions fees.
If the National Park Service were to do the same at popular national
parks, however, it might be perceived as inappropriate government
profiteering at the expense of its own citizens.150
Because facilities such as national parks are viewed as a
public trust, there is a shared sense that they should be equally
available to all. When access to national parks must be limited, it
is often distributed by lottery rather than on the basis of price.
For example, rooms at high-demand hotels in some parks become
available on designated dates and are distributed at moderate
prices to those who are fortunate enough to obtain access by
phone or internet.151 The alternative model of raising the price to
the equilibrium point would likely lead to intense public criticism.
Where appropriate, a public good or service is simply made
available to all on an equal basis, as with national defense, the
interstate highway system, and public utility service.
None of the so-called public categories are purely public,
and the distinction between public and private has become more
fluid in recent decades. Commodities formerly considered public
or mostly public, such as education, prison systems, and postal
service, have been privatized to a much greater degree than

149 See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 478–79, 560 (1970) (“[T]he function
which the courts must perform . . . is to promote equality of political power for a
disorganized and diffuse majority by remanding appropriate cases to the legislature after
public opinion has been aroused.”).
150 See Pérez, supra note 8, at 380–85 (discussing early cases challenging the
validity of charging for parking on public roadways).
151 See, e.g., Phantom Ranch Lottery Submission, GRAND CANYON NAT’L PARK
LODGES, https://secure.grandcanyonlodges.com/phantom-ranch-lottery?_ga=2.18457245
7.1071513622.1575929746-925608667.1575929746 [https://perma.cc/M8U7-SFQ3].
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previously.152 Chicago has leased its on-street parking meters to
a private entity.153 Private communities today furnish many of
the services that have traditionally been considered public,
including roadways, recreational facilities, and security.154 Some
of the lodging and dining options in national parks are
outsourced.155 But there is probably considerable consensus
among the citizenry as to what goods and services are considered
public and should be available to all.
Once again, there are hybrids, which means that the
distinction between public and private, as with the two other
categories just discussed, is more of a continuum. Many utilities,
and most cable television and internet providers, are privately
owned but regulated in ways that are somewhat similar to public
entities. Common carriers such as airlines are privately owned
but heavily regulated. Social media platforms also are privately
owned but likely to be regulated more like public utilities in the
future. Some of these regulated commodities are necessities, or
nearly so. And they are often industries in which economies of
scale or first-mover advantages limit the amount of competition
that is feasible. First-movers also benefit from the subsequent
adoption—often at their own urging—of regulatory restrictions
that did not impede them.156 “The ‘start-up’ may not generally
want regulation now, but you better believe that it’ll make the
most of it once it is there.”157
D.

Contrasting and Harmonizing These Three Matrices

The previous three Sections have contrasted necessities
with luxuries, elastic goods with inelastic goods, and public
goods with private goods, noting all the while that these three
152 See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Cashing in on Convicts: Privatization, Punishment,
and the People, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 579, 582–85 (summarizing the potential financial gains
for private corrections companies).
153 Andrew Stern, Chicago Leases Parking Meters for $1.16 Billion, REUTERS
(Dec. 2, 2008), https://www.reuters.com/article/chicago-parkingmeters/chicago-leases-pa
rking-meters-for-1-16-billion-idUSN0227950220081202 [https://perma.cc/GH76-3BRN]
(describing a first-of-its-kind deal for the leasing of more than 36,000 parking spaces).
154 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS
613–14 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing the functions of residential community associations).
155 See, e.g., Reed Engle, Park Concessions: Historic Privatization, NAT’L PARK
SERV.: SHENANDOAH NAT’L PARK, https://www.nps.gov/articles/park-concessions-historicprivatization.htm [https://perma.cc/UAA4-X8DB]] (“Today we read a great deal about the
outsourcing and privatization of governmental tasks. But for over 125 years the National
Park Service has worked closely with private partners to provide for visitors’ needs.”).
156 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 20, at 161 (“[T]he most successful unicorn startups quickly become incumbents, and one way to prevent competition is to accept certain
regulatory requirements that will prove more burdensome to newcomers.”).
157 Ilya Shapiro & David McDonald, Regulation Uber Alles: How Governments
Hurt Workers and Consumers in the New New Economy, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 461, 483.
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pairs of polar extremes are actually points at opposing ends of
an uninterrupted spectrum.158 In some cases, it can be difficult
to determine where a commodity falls along a given spectrum,
and goods and services can shift over time, as do the matrices
themselves. In addition, these three matrices are somewhat
independent of each other, and the location of a good or service
on one matrix does not necessarily predict where it will fall on
the others. Some public goods are necessities, but others are not.
Some public goods are highly inelastic, while others are more
elastic. Thus, when examining any specific good or service, it is
important to determine where it falls on each of the three
matrices independently.
These three queries are nothing more than instruments
that help us examine the more significant question of whether the
sharing economy exacerbates inequality. The answer to that larger
question in any given circumstance is likely to be highly nuanced
rather than a simple “yes” or “no.” If an elastic luxury provided by
the private market suddenly shoots up in price, we probably should
not be concerned: The supply will increase quickly and temporary
shortages will cause no harm. If an inelastic public necessity
suddenly is in short supply, though, as might happen to one busy
roadway while the only alternative route is under repair, then
dynamically priced tolls on the surviving road are more worrisome.
Many people have no choice but to use the public thoroughfare,
there is no alternative on the horizon, and surge pricing will
increase the unaffordability of the road.
There are some settings in which the platform economy and
its regular use of surge pricing may increase inequality in a way
that has long been tolerated and viewed as unobjectionable. Many
goods range in quality from lavish to simply serviceable, and the
fact that some people enjoy luxury cars while others scrape by with
entry-level vehicles is not particularly troublesome, whether they
are owned or shared. In other cases, the fact that a commodity can
be sliced up into smaller units and sold rapidly at a constantly
changing price may present inequality concerns that were not
evident before. If, for example, the rapid growth of home-share
listings causes the urban housing supply to shrink and fewer
people can afford even the most minimal permanent
accommodations, then the growth of the sharing economy is more
worrisome and may merit a public or private response.159
Similarly, if activities that are taxed locally, such as hotel
stays, are supplanted by activities that may escape taxation,
158
159

See supra Sections II.A–C.
See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text.
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such as VRBO stays, governments will have less tax money
available to provide public services. The many beneficiaries of
these broad-based government services suffer so that a smaller
number of VRBO patrons can enjoy less costly accommodations.
In the case of home stays, this loss of a transfer payment from
more affluent consumers to their less prosperous neighbors is
particularly pernicious: Hotel taxes are imposed on transient
visitors to charge them for public benefits they otherwise enjoy
for free or below cost.160
As the sharing economy expands, commodities that are
necessities, inelastic, or public, or some combination of the three,
raise the greatest concerns. As noted above, the market must
provide sufficient necessities, it takes longer to expand the supply
of inelastic commodities, and public goods and services should be
available to all who desire them on terms that are generally
equitable. The sharing economy makes more commodities more
readily available to more comers, which sometimes increases
scarcity, price, and the speed at which both arise. Dynamic pricing
thus may price some would-be purchasers out of the market just
when they need a product the most.
Finally, this entire discussion so far has assumed that all
citizens are able to participate in these modern electronic markets.
But some people cannot afford a smartphone or access to
broadband internet, and some of those who can may not qualify for
the credit card they need to purchase goods and services online.161
These are the same citizens who are least likely to be early adopters
of new technology, suggesting that they will continue to fall further
behind. Any discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of recent
changes must address the ways in which non-participants in
modern markets can be included without becoming further
disadvantaged. If the sharing economy is increasing inequality,
these are the people likely to lag the most.162
160 There is some evidence that the overall tourism sector seems to be growing and
that home shares are not simply replacing hotel stays. See, e.g., ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE
SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM
121–23 (2016) (noting that the evidence is mixed but that short-term rental units are often
located in neighborhoods with few hotel rooms, such as the outer boroughs of New York City);
Lobel, supra note 20, at 114–15 (describing how the growth of Airbnb may have expanded the
overall tourism industry). If this is true, then local governments are not losing existing
funding but are failing to benefit from expansions.
161 See Ginia Bellafante, How the Cashless Economy Shuts Out the Poor, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/nyregion/how-the-cashless-economy-shu
ts-out-the-poor.html?action=click&module=News&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/W6J
8-M4HG].
162 See Schor, supra note 68, at 265 (“[P]latform activity is likely exacerbating
inequality within the [bottom] 80% [of the population], shifting more income and
opportunity to better-off households and providers.”); id. at 276 (noting that earning money
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SHORT-RUN AND LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF THE SHARING
ECONOMY

This Part will attempt to predict how the sharing economy
might affect economic inequality in the short-run and in the longrun. Predictions are hazardous, particularly in an area in which
technological breakthroughs can cause unforeseeable outcomes,
and even the sharing economy itself was inconceivable just a few
years ago. Nonetheless, this Part will attempt to illustrate some
of the likely outcomes that future expansion of the sharing
economy and increased use of dynamic pricing for goods and
services might bring about.
A.

Short-Run Effects

If demand for a commodity drops or supply increases, the
equilibrium price will drop accordingly in the short run. This has
always been true, but the growth of the platform economy and
the increased use of dynamic pricing permit more accurate realtime valuation and allow consumers instant access to the
knowledge that prices are lower. Less affluent people will now
have access to commodities they did not previously recognize fell
within their price range. The commodity may be available in last
year’s model, in an unpopular color, or at an off-peak time, but
an imperfect good is usually better than no good, and if it is not,
then the consumer will not buy it.163 Thus, these price reductions
should increase the well-being of those who can now obtain items
they previously could not.
Differential pricing of less desirable near-substitutes also
occurs in other contexts. Restaurants have long offered earlybird specials, happy hours, and, for that matter, lunch. In each
case, they are trying to move a seat at a vacant table, which is a
perishable commodity. If the restaurant fills a table between
4:45 and 5:45, it earns revenue that might otherwise have been
lost. Of course, if the establishment offers this table at too low a
price, a peak-time diner may opt for the less costly early meal,
through these platforms often requires that the provider already possess a valuable asset
such as a nice home or car).
163 This type of price drop has always existed, as patrons of the now-defunct
Filene’s Basement can attest. Filene’s Basement not only offered odd styles and sizes at
discounted prices, it also let the consumer know the dates on which future price drops
would occur, thereby allowing the shopper to decide whether to pay the current reduced
price or wait for the price to drop still further, at the risk that someone else might snap
it up in the interim. See Martha Weinman Lear, Remembering the Fever, and Fun, of the
Basement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/fashion/farew
ell-to-filenes-basement.html [https://perma.cc/F7AT-768E].
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thereby costing the restaurant the difference in revenue if it
cannot fill the now-available peak-time table. Restaurants must
guess exactly what price will fill less desirable seats with new
customers rather than bargain-hunting current patrons.164
New algorithms and widespread use of smartphones
permit a far greater array of goods and services to be priced
differentially. The high-end Chicago restaurant Alinea presells
all of its dinner seats online, with differential pricing for different
days of the week, times of the evening, and number of courses.165
Even the cheapest meal at Alinea can hardly be described as a
bargain, but a ten-course meal late on a Wednesday priced at
$205 is a less costly substitute for an eighteen-course feast at 7:30
on a Saturday priced at $360.166
The growth of the sharing economy thus increases the
speed at which less desirable goods become more readily
obtainable by people of limited means, but also increases the
speed at which more precious goods become available only to
those of greater affluence. Just when a product becomes more
desirable or less available, poorer people will become unable to
afford it. People of limited means will be better able to acquire a
greater abundance of less desirable goods and services but less
able to procure more desirable commodities. What used to be a
feature of a handful of products such as airline tickets is rapidly
becoming an attribute of all aspects of our market economy.
The expanded reach of the sharing economy thus means
that prices will become more volatile. Many people have
experienced the frustration of having an airline seat disappear
because the airline’s pricing algorithm raises the price before the
buyer clicks “Purchase.” Because dynamic prices move in real
time, purchasers will face more surprises and will be less able to
plan purchases in advance. Consumers for whom minor price
differences matter the most lose the ability to plan ahead,
particularly for larger purchases. These attributes of the sharing
164 De facto surge pricing is common at many restaurants on popular nights
such as New Year’s Eve and Valentine’s Day.

Restaurants have long known that charging a fee for a reservation offends
people’s sensibilities—but that on a big night like New Year’s Eve you can
require everyone to eat an expensive fixed-price menu with lobster and filet.
Diners will happily pay a surge price without thinking of it as such.
Irwin, supra note 34.
165 Book a Table, ALINEA, https://alinearestaurant.com/site/reservations-contact/
[https://perma.cc/WGH8-QWUW]. Diners must prepay for their meal when they book their
reservation but can add alcoholic beverages at the time of the meal, thereby spreading the
pain of the large check. Id.
166 See Alinea, TOCK, https://www.exploretock.com/alinea/ [https://perma.cc/K6
4J-6Z93] (comparing pricing options).
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economy, once again, are of the greatest concern when the
commodity in question is a necessity, inelastic, or public.167
B.

Long-Run Effects

If predicting short-run effects involves considerable
guesswork, then predicting longer-run effects is even more
perilous. But if we assume that the laws of economics and human
behavior remain somewhat constant, we can make some tentative
forecasts. Less affluent people may enjoy some long-run benefits as
sharing becomes a greater portion of our economy. To the extent
they may have been priced out of securing certain commodities due
to inadequate supplies or sudden increases in demand in the shortterm, the market should self-correct more quickly than before, as
the high price telegraphs a message to suppliers to produce more
goods. As new supplies enter the market, the price will drop. There
will be price volatility along the way and sellers will pricediscriminate as much as they can, but the market will continue to
establish new and constantly shifting equilibria, and more rapidly
than in the past. Less affluent consumers may ultimately benefit
by obtaining the good, if more slowly.
This equilibrium is actually beneficial to less affluent
people in two ways. First, as just noted, after a price jolt triggers
an increase in supply, the cost will drop back down. Second, the
temporarily enhanced demand will lead to an increase in jobs
supplying this commodity.168 Someone in the supply chain is
meeting this newly increased demand, and that supplier may be
an Uber driver or home-sharer who benefits financially by
supplying a good that the market has suddenly requested at a
favorable price. These workers will need to be nimble, though,
as new information continuously causes shifts in other supply
and demand curves. If the price of rides drops too much, that
Uber driver may need to supplement her income by finding a
different demand to meet.
Less affluent people thus benefit from dynamic pricing by
supplying commodities that are newly scarce, thereby increasing
their income in flexible ways, and by using this augmented
income to afford more goods and services at favorable prices.
They enjoy the fruits of their labors to the extent their growing
budgets permit, suppliers gain by expanding their markets, and
commodities that previously may have gone to waste can be
See supra Part II.
Professor Juliet Schor notes, however, that the platform economy allows whitecollar workers to supplement their incomes by engaging in blue- and pink-collar work, which
might exacerbate existing income inequality. See Schor, supra note 68, at 272–74.
167
168
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enjoyed more efficiently.169 This aids the economy overall and
may also be friendlier to the environment.170
The expansion of off-peak dynamic pricing may benefit
less wealthy consumers in other ways. Uber now offers UberPool
for budget-conscious riders, in which multiple passengers with
different pick-up and drop-off locations share one vehicle for
overlapping rides.171 These passengers enjoy slower service at a
lower price, the driver benefits by collecting more in total fares,
and fewer vehicles can provide transportation to an increased
number of riders.172 The technology that gave birth to the sharing
economy allows an amalgamation of luxury, middle-of-the-road,
and third-tier services to co-exist and adapt to changing
conditions flexibly. Improved algorithms can plan routes more
efficiently than harried taxi dispatchers, and underserved
communities enjoy improved service.173
Not only do less affluent people benefit from new options
that previously were non-existent or unaffordable, and not only can
they sell more goods and services to others, they also may benefit
by spending some of their new income on previously-out-of-reach
luxury items. The monthly payments on a vehicle may have been
unaffordable in the past, but their increased income from the
sharing economy, perhaps earned by driving people around for a
169 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 122, at 164 (“[T]he sheer volume of Airbnb
rentals far surpasses any loss in market share seen by hotels.”).
170 Note, though, that technology also allows for the more efficient use of underutilized roadways by those with navigation apps, to the consternation of people who live on those
roads. See, e.g., Lisa W. Foderaro, Navigation Apps Are Turning Quiet Neighborhoods into
Traffic Nightmares, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/24/nyregion/
traffic-apps-gps-neighborhoods.html [https://perma.cc/UCY8-MC4G].
171 See UberPool: Together We Save, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/ride/
uberpool/ [https://perma.cc/UCY8-MC4G].
172 Professor Nicole Garnett has examined the prevalence of similar informal
transportation arrangements in New York City’s outer boroughs. See Nicole Stelle
Garnett, The Road from Welfare to Work: Informal Transportation and the Urban Poor,
38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173, 182 (2001) (“[D]espite having shorter average commute
distances, poor minority workers still spend significantly more time commuting to work
than do more affluent white workers.”); id. at 198–217 (discussing the prevalence of
informal private jitney services in New York and Miami); see also Gregory Scruggs, Mass
Movements, Mixed Results: Latin American Cities Lead the Way on Urban Transit—But
Who Benefits?, LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y: LANDLINES (July 2018), https://www.lincolni
nst.edu/publications/articles/mass-movements-mixed-results [https://perma.cc/3DDM-X
KSR] (“[A] day laborer in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas can count on a shared van that serves
his neighborhood when the city’s official bus system does not.”).
173 See Jeffery C. Mays, Uber Gains Civil Rights Allies Against New York’s Proposed
Freeze: ‘It’s a Racial Issue,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/201
8/07/29/nyregion/uber-cap-civil-rights.html [https://perma.cc/ELB2-U4AF] (“Uber statistics,
[a spokesman] said, show that ridership in neighborhoods such as East New York in Brooklyn
and Kingsbridge in the Bronx had more than doubled since this time last year.”); Uber 2018,
Don’t Strand NYC, YOUTUBE (July 25, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nH3B2vWIw0&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/P7KR-H67N] (Uber advertisement opposing
proposed limits on Uber in New York City).
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few hours a week, might now allow them to purchase that car.
These consumers will enjoy new transportation options either by
being someone else’s automobile landlord for a few minutes or
someone else’s automobile tenant, and perhaps both.174
As a result, every participant in the market will be in a
position to own or rent a wider variety of goods and services, now
available in exactly the size and configuration each party needs.
People will enjoy greater access to the precise mix of goods and
services they want and can acquire this more diverse package to
the extent their budgets permit. If funds are tight, they still may
be able to obtain less fancy models or off-peak services, which is
usually better than not being able to afford anything.
The distinction that this Section draws with the previous
one, between long-run and short-run effects, is somewhat illusory.
The difference is one of timing, of course, but it is also a feedback
loop of cause and effect: One event leads to an immediate
response, and that response then causes a longer-run counterresponse. Over time, the ripples on the pond gradually drop in
amplitude and the market reaches its new equilibrium, until the
next set of changes begins advancing through the system.
In the sharing economy, this process happens quickly.
Information is disseminated almost instantaneously. Consumers
and suppliers are in a position to evaluate new knowledge rapidly
and to make economic decisions promptly. Delivery is immediate
for goods such as e-books, and nearly so for others, with Amazon
Prime now offering same-day delivery in some cities and testing
Amazon Prime Air for delivery by drone.175 Second-order effects
become apparent far more rapidly than they used to.
All of this discussion ignores the effect that still newer
technologies—some on the drawing board today, others impossible
to imagine—will have on the economy. Some burgeoning
developments are already beginning to have their impact, as we all
try to anticipate how drones and autonomous vehicles will reshape
our world. Still others seem to come out of the blue: The first iPhone
was released on June 29, 2007, an economic cataclysm with
enormous repercussions that most people could not have foreseen
before that date.176
174 Even if this increase in sharing does not provide additional transportation
options—perhaps each rider was managing to afford their own vehicle, if with some difficulty—
it is certainly more efficient, as one car can now do the work that two or more used to.
175 Amazon Prime Air, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Prime-Air/b?
ie=UTF8&node=8037720011 [https://perma.cc/L9SF-2G5L] (“We’re excited about Prime
Air—a delivery system from Amazon designed to safely get packages to customers in 30
minutes or less using unmanned aerial vehicles, also called drones.”).
176 WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 474 (2011).
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There is no reason to assume that the iPhone was the last
major invention that will ever have this type of impact.177 If
anything, world-changing events such as this seem to arise more
frequently than before.178 Just as Alexander Graham Bell could
not have imagined smartphones and Thomas Edison could not
have imagined Spotify, who knows what Steve Jobs did not
imagine?179 And who knows what innovation is in the offing that
will make Steve Jobs seem as far remote in the past as Bell and
Edison seem today?180
C.

Transition Issues

We are in the early stages of transitioning to an economy
that relies on access and sharing, and more and more people
have become willing to lease assets and services in creative
ways.181 A person may buy a home with the idea of letting it out
for short periods of time or may buy an auto planning to
transport passengers for even shorter increments.182 Conversely,
someone with only sporadic needs for a home or auto may decide
to access it for brief periods as needed even though they might
never contemplate outright ownership.183 This trend appears
likely to continue, as people devise new ways of divvying up
assets in ways that more closely correlate with their needs,
desires, and budgets. Commodities will be shared cooperatively
among multiple users, waste may be reduced, the environment

177 Fifteen years ago, if someone had predicted the rapid increase in the use of
unmanned aerial vehicles, they might have invested in a company that would allow
Blockbuster to deliver videos to its customers rapidly by drone. In retrospect, that would
have been a poor investment, as it overestimated the impact of one technological
transformation while utterly failing to foresee another. See, e.g., Alex Horton, ‘Why Are
You Still Here?’: Inside the Last Blockbuster in America, WASH. POST (July 16, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/07/14/why-are-you-still-hereinside-the-last-blockbuster-left-in-america/?utm_term=.911b23135c84 [https://perma.c
c/BN83-GQ5T] (“In 1989, a Blockbuster store opened every 17 hours, The Post’s Samantha
Schmidt reported last year. But in the late 2000s, it seemed that the stores were closing at
that same pace.”).
178 See RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND
BIOLOGY 35 (2005) (describing “[t]he ongoing acceleration of technology” and “the acceleration
of the pace of and the exponential growth of the products of an evolutionary process”).
179 See Kara Swisher, Owning a Car Will Soon Be as Quaint as Owning a Horse,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/22/opinion/end-of-carsuber-lyft.html [https://perma.cc/6MVP-XFKU].
180 See FTC, THE “SHARING” ECONOMY, supra note 49, at 8 (“[T]he speed and
unpredictability of this innovation will likely make it necessary to adjust regulation
substantially as sharing economy markets develop, and therefore call[s] for flexibility in
regulatory approaches and avoidance of preemptive regulation.”).
181 See supra notes 52–59 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 52–59 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
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might benefit, work schedules will become more flexible, and
living standards should increase.184
But rapid transformation of a market leads to displacement
of those who assumed that the old method of doing business would
not change so rapidly and unexpectedly. No one can safely assume
that current conditions will persist forever, and people typically
have no legal right to protection of their business expectations.185
The sudden expansion of the sharing economy, however, and the
fact that it emerged with so little forewarning, has shocked and
harmed some market actors, sometimes with tragic results.186 The
sharing economy may create plenty of winners, but it causes other
market participants to lose.
It is likely that the overall benefits of the sharing
economy will be far greater than the losses and displacement it
will create.187 Those benefits, however, will not be distributed
evenly. The fact that total gains may vastly exceed total losses
will be little consolation to the driver who purchased a New York
City taxi medallion in 2013 for $1 million188 and has watched its
value plummet by roughly three-quarters.189 Does someone—the
government, the taxpayers, or the workers, passengers, and
shareholders who benefit from the advent of ride-sharing—owe
anything to that displaced medallion owner?190

184 See John O. McGinnis, The Sharing Economy as an Equalizing Economy 11–
12 (Northwestern Univ. Pritzker Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory No. 18-19, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3225868 [https://perma.cc/WC8NXXN9] (discussing non-monetary benefits that sharing economy jobs may provide).
185 Cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(recognizing constitutional protection for “distinct investment-backed expectations” in
certain circumstances).
186 See, e.g., Ginia Bellafante, A Driver’s Suicide Reveals the Dark Side of the
Gig Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/06/nyregion/
livery-driver-taxi-uber.html [https://perma.cc/69XA-SSU2] (“On Monday morning, Doug
Schifter, a livery driver in his early 60s, killed himself with a shotgun in front of City
Hall in Lower Manhattan, having written a lengthy Facebook post several hours earlier
laying out the structural cruelties that had left him in such dire circumstance.”).
187 If this turns out not to be true, then the expansion of the sharing economy
is an unfavorable development that the market will likely resist.
188 In July 2013, four taxi medallions were sold for prices ranging from $1,000,000
to $1,050,000. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, July 2013 Medallion Transfers,
NYC.GOV, http://home.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/july_2013_medallion_transfers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MQ84-VP6Z].
189 In July 2018, thirty-six medallions were sold, twenty-two of them via foreclosure.
Setting aside the five that passed through estates without consideration, prices ranged between
$145,000 and $360,000 except for two that appear to have sold for $1,000,000 each. N.Y.C. Taxi
& Limousine Comm’n, July 2018 Medallion Sales Chart, NYC.GOV, http://home.nyc.gov/html/tl
c/downloads/pdf/july_2018_medallion_transfer_list.pdf [https://perma.cc/TE67-UMRB].
190 See Winnie Hu, Taxi Medallions, Once a Safe Investment, Now Drag Owners Into
Debt, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/10/nyregion/new-york-taximedallions-uber.html?action=click&module=Top%2520Stories&pgtype=Homepage [https://per
ma.cc/B7PD-HWX7] (discussing the increasing number of foreclosures on taxi medallions).
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Similar questions arose in the 1990s, when the United
States was considering ratification of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).191 That three-nation treaty was
designed to create overall benefits, including fair competition,
increased investment, and, presumably, lower-cost commodities,
but would have uneven effects on particular industries and
workers.192 For example, the increased availability of inexpensive
goods from Mexico would reduce prices for all American shoppers
but would have negative effects on the more concentrated group
of people employed in the American-based industries that had
previously manufactured those goods domestically.193 That is
what happened, although experts disagree about the causes.194
Workers who believe they were displaced by this treaty,
some of whom are still suffering financially, are likely
supporters of President Trump’s promise to pull the United
States out of NAFTA.195 The treaty functioned as designed but
offered inadequate recompense to those who bore its economic
brunt.196 Had NAFTA’s American beneficiaries transferred some
of their gains to NAFTA’s American victims, those who were
better off still would have benefited, if somewhat less, while
those who were worse off would have seen their suffering
alleviated at least in part.197 Instead, there was a net positive
impact on the American economy, the winners won more than
they otherwise might have, the losers lost rather than breaking
even or coming out ahead, and a small group bore—and

191 See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
192 Id. § 102 (Objectives).
193 James McBride & Mohammed Aly Sergie, NAFTA’s Economic Impact, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/naftas-economic-impact
[https://perma.cc/A7QM-QP6T] (“[W]hile the costs are highly concentrated in specific
industries like auto manufacturing, the benefits of a deal like NAFTA are distributed widely
across society.”).
194 See, e.g., 20 Years On, Debating Whether NAFTA Is Success Story or Damaging
Policy, PBS: NEWS HOUR (Feb. 20, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/nafta-successstory-damaging-policy [https://perma.cc/5LXE-FZ3Q] (transcript of televised debate between
former U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills and Director of Public Citizen Global Trade
Watch Policy Group Lori Wallach).
195 See Glenn Thrush, Trump Says He Plans to Withdraw from NAFTA, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/02/us/politics/trump-withdrawnafta.html [https://perma.cc/FPA6-BU4N].
196 Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 65, at 329 (describing a type of wage insurance for
workers in this position in which “displaced workers would receive a wage supplement
amounting to half the gap between their current and previous earnings, up to an annual
maximum of $10,000”).
197 This discussion focuses exclusively on domestic policy and intentionally
disregards the numerous and very real benefits and losses to those in Mexico and Canada.
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continues to bear—most of the burden of these changes and
likely resents that fact.198
The early signs from the sharing economy suggest that
we have again embarked on a journey in which our economic
system, red in tooth and claw, inflicts pain on those who happen
to lose as a result of change. Many of those who suffer, not
surprisingly, will be less affluent participants in our economic
system who have little access to the levers of power, much like
the factory workers whose jobs moved to Mexico following
NAFTA.199 The sharing economy may end up benefiting both
Uber drivers and Uber passengers, but it will leave many taxi
medallion holders behind. Even if these medallion holders move
on to new jobs—perhaps as Uber drivers—they will forfeit much
of the value of their costly medallions.
Illinois Transportation Trade Association v. City of
Chicago200 is instructive. This case involved constitutional
challenges by taxicab and livery service owners and operators to
Chicago’s adoption of an ordinance that holds ride-sharing
services to more permissive standards for operation.201 The
plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the city had
unconstitutionally taken their taxi medallions without just
compensation, in violation of the Takings Clause.202 Judge Posner,
writing for a unanimous three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit,
shredded this argument, beginning by noting that “‘[p]roperty’
does not include a right to be free from competition.”203 His opinion
leaves little doubt that Chicago bears no legal responsibility for
the economic impact of its decision to regulate ride-sharing
differently from taxi and livery services:
Indeed when new technologies, or new business methods, appear, a
common result is the decline or even disappearance of the old. Were
the old deemed to have a constitutional right to preclude the entry of
the new into the markets of the old, economic progress might grind to
198 For a useful comparison, see Paul Waldman, A $12 Billion Solution to a Political
Problem of Trump’s Own Making, WASH. POST (July 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/economy/white-house-readies-plan-for-12-billion-in-emergency-aid-to-farmerscaught-in-trumps-escalating-trade-war/2018/07/24/7bec9af4-8f4d-11e8-b769-e3fff17f0689_st
ory.html?utm_term=.79b1a5a9f170 [https://perma.cc/Z4PB-ZCSY] (noting that “the new plan
could revive debates about taxpayer-funded bailouts and the degree to which Trump’s trade
strategy is leading to unforeseen costs”).
199 For a thoughtful discussion of this issue authored soon after NAFTA’s adoption,
see Fran Ansley, Inclusive Boundaries and Other (Im)Possible Paths Toward Community
Development in a Global World, 50 U. PENN. L. REV. 353 (2001) (discussing plant closings in
the Southeastern United States after NAFTA); id. at 389–405 (describing interactions
between displaced American workers and the Mexican workers who displaced them).
200 Illinois Transp. Trade Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 839 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2016).
201 Id. at 595–96.
202 Id. at 596.
203 Id.
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a halt. Instead of taxis we might have horse and buggies; instead of
the telephone, the telegraph; instead of computers, slide rules.
Obsolescence would equal entitlement.
Taxi medallions authorize the owners to own and operate taxis,
not to exclude competing transportation services. The plaintiffs in this
case cannot exclude competition from buses or trains or bicycles or
liveries or chartered sightseeing vehicles or jitney buses or walking;
indeed they cannot exclude competition from taxicab newcomers, for
the City has reserved the right (which the plaintiffs don’t challenge)
to issue additional taxi medallions. Why then should the plaintiffs be
allowed to exclude competition from Uber? To this question they offer
no answer.204

The Court is almost certainly correct in its result, and there
is little reason to reduce transportation options and maintain
inflated costs to the detriment of Chicago’s passengers.205 The real
question, though, is not whether Chicago was constitutionally
required to protect its licensed taxicab and livery drivers from
competition by the sudden and rapid growth of ride-sharing
services.206 Rather, it is whether Chicago could be doing something
to insulate participants in an established and heavily regulated
industry against the displacement that results as technological
change makes the service they have long provided, at considerable
personal investment, less desirable.207 And if we protect the taxi
driver whose six-figure medallion is plummeting in value, why
should we not extend the same safeguards to the low-wage
American worker who is replaced by a lower-wage Mexican or
Chinese worker, a robot, or an algorithm?208
Id. at 596–97.
See Isaacson, supra note 56 (describing “city officials [that] had become so
beholden to and intimidated by the taxi industry that the medallion and licensing system
had become a way to protect the interests of the owners rather than of passengers”).
206 See also Joe Sanfelippo Cabs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 839 F.3d 613, 614
(7th Cir. 2016) (companion case to Illinois Transp. Trade Ass’n); Phila. Taxi Ass’n, Inc.
v. Uber Techs., Inc., 886 F.3d 332, 344 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Were we to award Appellants
antitrust damages to compensate for their financial injuries, we would condemn vigorous
competition, rather than encourage it.”); Checker Cab Operators, Inc. v. Miami-Dade
County, 899 F.3d 908, 912 (11th Cir. 2018) (“The medallions conferred by the County
created a license to offer for-hire taxicab services in Miami-Dade County; the County did
not afford the Medallion Holders the right to exclude competition in the marketplace.”).
207 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 122, at 176 (“[W]hile it might be easy to view the
situation as a David and Goliath tale of fighting for a defined market share, the truth is
likely more complicated.”).
208 The Uber driver who just made a taxi driver’s job obsolete ought to be
sympathetic, as they probably recognize that autonomous vehicles will soon relegate
them to the same fate. See generally Katrina M. Wyman, Taxi Regulation in the Age of
Uber, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 77–98 (2017) (discussing and rejecting the
legal, economic, and fairness justifications for compensating owners of taxi medallions);
David K. Suska, Regulatory Takings and Ridesharing: “Just Compensation” for Taxi
Medallion Owners?, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 183, 198–212 (2016) (same, but
arguing in favor of transition relief for efficiency reasons).
204
205
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Chicago might have imposed a one-dollar fee on every
shared ride, with the money dedicated to educating former taxi
drivers and easing their transition into another job. The city
could have bought back a certain number of medallions, so that
the reduction in demand for these mandatory licenses would be
partially offset by a decrease in supply. It might have
established higher barriers of entry for Uber at the outset—
perhaps by requiring a less costly type of ride-share medallion—
while telegraphing that it would gradually reduce these barriers
over time, so that traditional taxi medallion holders would have
a longer period in which to amortize their investment and begin
transitioning into other jobs.
None of these policies are required, in the court’s view,
and some might be viewed as anti-competitive by Uber, Lyft, and
their supporters or might be opposed by the riders or taxpayers
who would have to fund them. But each might have smoothed
over some of the rougher edges of our economic system by
transferring some of the gainers’ gains to help offset the losers’
losses. These alternatives also might reduce some of the political
backlash that difficult transitions generate among those who
suffer the greatest displacement. Even Lyft itself has floated the
idea of voluntarily adopting a transfer payment system to assist
displaced taxi drivers.209
New York City has recently taken steps to soften the
transition to ride sharing.210 The City has capped the number of
ride-sharing vehicles in the city for two years and may extend
this limit beyond that,211 establishing the equivalent of a
temporary medallion program for ride shares to match the one
already in existence for yellow cabs.212 This approach recreates a
gentler version of the transportation cartel that existed before
209 Ginia Bellafante, Uber and the False Hopes of the Sharing Economy, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/nyregion/uber-nyc-votedrivers-ride-sharing.html [https://perma.cc/S5AB-R8CL] (“[T]here had been discussion,
led primarily by Lyft, of a hardship fund to be set up by the various ride-hailing
companies to alleviate some of the suffering conventional drivers have experienced, but
that was only going to go forward if the city agreed not to impose a cap [on the number
of ride-sharing drivers].”).
210 See Fitzsimmons, supra note 42.
211 Irina Ivanova, New York Extends Freeze on New Uber and Lyft Drivers, CBS
News (June 12, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nyc-uber-cap-gets-extended/
[https://perma.cc/6BYR-4JK7].
212 See Fitzsimmons, supra note 42 (“Councilman Eric Ulrich, a Republican
from Queens, said he opposed the cap, arguing that limiting Uber to help yellow taxis
was similar to regulating Netflix, the streaming service, to help Blockbuster, the video
rental chain.”); cf. Gordon Y.K. Pang, Honolulu Mayor Vetoes Bill that Caps Uber/Lyft
Surge Pricing, HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER (June 19, 2018), http://www.staradvertiser.
com/2018/06/19/breaking-news/caldwell-vetoes-bill-that-caps-uberlyft-surge-pricing/
[https://perma.cc/MAP2-J8RZ].
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the advent of ride-sharing.213 New York has also adopted a
minimum wage of $17.22 after expenses for ride-sharing drivers,
effectively transferring funds from patrons and platform
shareholders to service workers.214 Passengers, or perhaps the
intermediary platform, must pay this minimum hourly amount
to drivers, which means that the beneficiaries of the ride-share
revolution will have to hand over some of their gains to the
industry’s workers. Depending on its final form, this proposal
might reduce the competitive advantages ride-sharing drivers
enjoy over drivers of traditional taxis. This is a tentative step in
the direction of using some of the benefits created by the sharing
economy to mitigate individual losses.215
IV.

DYNAMIC PRICING, ALLOCATION OF SCARCE RESOURCES,
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERVENTION

The discussion so far has addressed whether the recent
expansion of the sharing economy will increase inequality,
particularly through the spread of dynamic pricing. That inquiry,
though, raises the more basic economic question of how we should
allocate scarce resources.
A.

Dynamic Pricing and the Allocation of Scarce Resources

We have seen that the dynamic pricing characteristic of
much of the sharing economy is often more economically efficient
than the method of allocation it displaces.216 As sharing
technology continues to advance, suppliers and consumers enjoy
increased and rapid access to information.217 Every time a supply
213 See Fitzsimmons, supra note 42 (“Uber has warned its riders that the cap could
produce higher prices and longer wait times for passengers if the company cannot keep up
with the growing demand.”). Since the City will not be issuing new licenses for at least one
year, a secondary market for ride-sharing licenses might develop in parallel with the
secondary market in traditional taxi medallions. Some of the benefit intended for yellowcab drivers might be transferred to those who currently hold for-hire-vehicle licenses, since
those are likely to increase in value due to the government’s artificially created shortage.
214 Joshua Brustein, New York Sets Nation’s First Minimum Wage for Uber,
Lyft Drivers, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201812-04/new-york-sets-nation-s-first-minimum-wage-for-uber-lyft-drivers
[https://perma.cc/CJK6-MFTW].
215 Every step taken to address one problem will likely create others. See, e.g.,
Emily Badger, What’s the Right Number of Taxis (or Uber or Lyft Cars) in a City?, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/upshot/uber-lyft-taxi-idealnumber-per-city.html [https://perma.cc/6CUW-NUX8] (“The right number [of ride-sharing
vehicles] then is best thought of as more of a sweet spot in the trade-offs between
convenience and congestion; high wages and short waits; what’s best for individuals and
what’s best for everyone.”).
216 See supra Sections I.A–B.
217 See supra Sections I.A–B.
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or demand curve shifts, the price equilibrates almost
instantly.218 This leads to more precise pricing and re-pricing
while also increasing volatility and uncertainty.219 The growth of
the sharing economy also makes it more feasible for multiple
market participants to co-own assets in a variety of different
legal structures that were not practicable just a few years ago.220
The platform economy, then, seems to be the neoclassical
economist’s dream. Microeconomics is often criticized because its
assumptions do not reflect actual human behavior.221 People are not
always rational. They may lack the information they need to make
wise decisions. Transactions costs may make desirable behavior
cumbersome or expensive.222 The sharing economy reduces these
problems, by providing massive quantities of information and
processing capacity to consumers and suppliers cheaply and quickly.
Armed with this information, economic actors can act more like the
neoclassical model predicts they will.
In some respects, this reduction of drag will be beneficial
to most market participants.223 Goods and services will be
promptly allocated at an ever-changing equilibrium price on the
basis of current supply and demand. Shifts will be telegraphed
throughout the market immediately, causing the expected
responses, and the market will reach a new equilibrium rapidly.
Lower transaction costs should translate into lower prices.224
These benefits will happen far more quickly than in the past,
and utility will increase.225
Levels of service and product quality will stratify, with a
menu of a la carte add-ons replacing a single unitary product or
See supra Sections I.A–B.
See supra Sections I.A–B.
220 See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
221 See POSNER, supra note 105, at 3–15, 20–22.
222 “Transactions costs” is sometimes used as a synonym for “middlemen,”
including brokers, agents, and lawyers. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by
Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 241–43 (1984)
(describing and contesting this perception). Reducing these costs may grease the overall
market but might also cause displacement in fields such as travel agency, real estate
brokerage, and legal services, as consumers become better equipped to perform these
services for themselves or to employ low-cost apps to do it for them.
223 See SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 160, at 129 (“[O]ur models project massive
gains in consumer surplus, on the order of tens of billions of dollars annually in the
United States alone. Most strikingly, lower-income households will enjoy these gains
disproportionately.”).
224 See Lobel, supra note 20, at 106–11 (illustrating ways in which online
platforms reduce transactions costs).
225 This is not meant to suggest that these increases in utility will be distributed
equally. For a thoughtful discussion of this question, see Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency
Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649, 1682 (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=3018796 [https://perma.cc/A36N-64JG] (“[E]fficient policies are tilted in favor of
rich-biased policies.”).
218
219
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service.226 Instead of a fixed-price ticket for a movie, there will be
a range of prices depending on seat location, day of the week,
time of day, and popularity of the film. Each consumer will have
more options for selecting the precise level of quality and service
that matches their requirements and pocketbook.227 Needs,
desires, and budgets can be more finely calibrated and
coordinated.228 If a resource is scarce and desirable, each
consumer of more limited means can make tradeoffs that allow
them to enjoy the specific benefits of the resource that are most
essential to that particular user.229
But these features will have predictable downsides as
well. Prices will become less stable, rising suddenly in response
to demand spikes or unanticipated shortages.230 It will become
harder to budget, since planning future expenditures requires
some certainty as to what their cost will be on the expected
purchase date.231 Consumer expectations are more likely to be
dashed, leading to greater disappointment and uncertainty.
Economic decisions will become more complex, as every basic
item comes with an array of upgrades, much like present-day
airline tickets. The shopping process will take longer, and the
ultimate price will be more masked.232
B.

The Possibility of Intervention in the Market

There is legitimate political disagreement as to whether
or when any intervention in the operation of the free market is
warranted. But if there is to be intervention at all, the case for
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
228 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
229 This stratification also applies to access to certain commodities. The “I Know
the Chef” app, with elite packages available for $1,250 per year, gives users priority on
the waiting lists for hot restaurants. Stephanie Strom, A Brief Guide to the Newer
Reservation Apps, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/29/dini
ng/restaurant-reservation-apps.html [https://perma.cc/95U9-VZQM]. Similarly, those
who wish to attend Supreme Court oral arguments may pay line-sitters to obtain access
for them. Robert Barnes, Should Wanting to See the Supreme Court Require Nights on
the Sidewalk?, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/co
urts_law/should-wanting-to-see-the-supreme-court-requires-nights-on-the-sidewalk/
2017/12/17/e48df938-db6e-11e7-b1a8-62589434a581_story.html?utm_term=.3f53c459d
732 [https://perma.cc/7AL8-AAR8].
230 See supra Section I.B.
231 Just as smaller, less affluent consumers may suffer negative consequences
from these features, so might smaller, less well-capitalized suppliers. The Amazons of
the world enjoy considerable competitive advantages over independent booksellers.
232 This discussion assumes that the platform economy really is untainted
capitalism and not “just one more play for capital accumulation in an increasingly stratified
economy.” Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 309, 313 (2016). Professor Pasquale proceeds to ask whether policymakers in this area
should focus more on fostering competition or regulating platform businesses. Id. at 316.
226
227
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it is strongest when the most vulnerable purchasers are in need
of the greatest protection.233 This occurs when the good or service
in question is some combination of necessary, inelastic, and
public.234 In these settings, the free market is most likely to
allocate essential or difficult-to-substitute resources in a manner
that harms those who are least well positioned to respond and
adapt. These are the circumstances in which price-based
allocation is most difficult to justify.235
Different types of market intervention might be
appropriate in particular situations and different parties might
perform this intervening. The consumer often lacks the
necessary legal and technical knowledge and is probably the
market participant least able to anticipate, avoid, or address
these sorts of problems. If there is to be any intervention at all—
and there need not be—that leaves the government, sellers, and
platform intermediaries.
1. Government Intervention
Government intervention could alleviate some allocation
problems and already does so in a limited number of cases.
Legislation might cap prices, provide subsidies to consumers or
providers, or redistribute assets in different ways. Governments
occasionally adopt wage and price controls and rationing, though
typically only in extreme circumstances such as wartime, and these
interventions are likely to be unwarranted and unpopular at most
other times.236 Federal and state governments have long provided
subsidies and similar support for housing and nutritional needs
and, for at least some Americans, health care as well.237 But some
view solutions such as these as extreme, and these remedies are
likely to be politically unpopular in many circumstances.
More promising is a moderate government-imposed
reallocation that transfers some of the overall benefits of the
sharing economy from the beneficiaries to that subset of actors
who suffer from it. This would not be a tax, but rather a
compulsory internalizing of externalities that a market actor

233 Cf. Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 45, at 1681–89 (arguing for an expanded
and updated application of consumer protection law to sharing transactions).
234 See supra Sections II.A–C.
235 For an excellent discussion of whether equilibrium pricing is inherently just, see
Robert C. Hockett and Roy Kreitner, Just Prices, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771 (2018).
236 See POSNER, supra note 105, at 197–200 (discussing rationales for and
criticisms of price controls).
237 See supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text.
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causes.238 To accomplish this goal, those who benefit under a
regime in which dynamic pricing is common would be required
to share some of their gains with those who lose under this
system. If the total gains arising from the transition to a sharing
economy exceed the total losses, those who benefit are in a
position to compensate fully those who suffer and still retain
some of their gain. Some market participants end up better off
than they were while none are any worse off.239
Intervention in this manner offers numerous benefits.
Since those who might otherwise suffer will receive a benefit to
offset their losses, they are better off than they would have been
in the absence of intervention and possibly even better off than
before the change occurred.240 They are less likely to oppose the
continued operation of a business model that harms them less.241
Meanwhile, those who benefit gain less than in the absence of
government intervention but more than if the sharing model
cannot proceed at all because of popular opposition to it.
In addition, this approach is likely to reduce antagonism
toward ongoing technological progress, since those who fear
unexpected change will know that any disruption they may endure
will be eased.242 An imposition on those who benefit from the
sharing economy might fund educational allowances, job
retraining, or loan forgiveness.243 Or it might be used to provide

238 Cf. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 668–69 (1994) (arguing that
redistributions of this type should be affected through the income tax system).
239 Cf. supra notes 178 and accompanying text.
240 Some of this suffering may be borne by the public at large. See Nikil Saval,
Uber and the Ongoing Erasure of Public Life, NEW YORKER (Feb. 18, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/dept-of-design/uber-and-the-ongoing-erasure-ofpublic-life [https://perma.cc/3LGK-7ZCY] (“Cities struggling to keep subways and buses
running are being drained of revenue by tech companies and a reserve army of cars.
These cars, in turn, coagulate the arteries of the city, blocking the remaining fleet of
buses, causing a downward spiral of decreasing ridership and growing traffic.”).
241 This approach mitigates the sudden displacement and disappointment of
expectations that were so evidently factors in the 2016 presidential campaign. Cf.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 65, at 329 (“[I]t is quite possible for the overall American pie ‘to
grow by 3 percent, and some slices to contract by 40 percent, and we’ve seen that. We
still have lots of displaced people, lots of angry people.’” (quoting MIT economist David
Autor speaking about ways to adjust to the rapid growth of imports from China)).
242 See id. at 28. (“[T]here is a mismatch between the change in the pace of
change and our ability to develop the learning systems, training systems, management
systems, social safety nets, and government regulations that would enable citizens to get
the most out of these accelerations and cushion their worst impacts.”).
243 See, e.g., Arun Sundararajan, Crowd-Based Capitalism, Digital Automation,
and the Future of Work, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 487, 510 (“One change that will be essential
is altering the mix of . . . education to be better suited for an economy of entrepreneurs,
emphasizing design, creativity, and entrepreneurship education over deeper investments
into cognitive skill-heavy professions with a higher probability of automation.”).
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additional services that offset benefits that have been lost.244 Some
of the revenues from Singapore’s auto licensing and congestion
pricing programs, for example, have been directed to support for
public projects that benefit the entire population.245 Those willing
and able to pay the fees enjoy the benefits of reduced traffic, while
everyone enjoys improvements in public amenities.246 And some
drivers presumably will respond to the levy by changing their
transit patterns in socially desirable ways.247
Government intervention in the marketplace causes
problems of its own, however.248 Rationing and price controls
distort the market and are ineffective in the long-run, as black
markets arise and flourish.249 Thus, they should be reserved for
only the most extreme cases, such as shortages of water and fuel
following natural disasters or during wartime, and they should
be left in place for as short a time as possible.250 Anti-gouging
laws strive to accomplish some of these goals, by limiting price
increases for essential goods in extreme situations.251 But
defining “essential” and “extreme” is challenging,252 and what

244 See Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Cuomo Warns of a 30 Percent Fare Hike if
Congestion Pricing Fails, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/
nyregion/congestion-pricing-fare-hike.html [https://perma.cc/H6R7-55G6].
245 Jianlin Chen & Jiongzhe Cui, More Market-Oriented than the United States
and More Socialist than China: A Comparative Public Property Story of Singapore, 23
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1, 8, 16–19 (2014) (describing Singapore’s program).
246 Id. at 18.
247 A driver might enter the high-traffic zone earlier in the day, thereby spreading
out traffic congestion in response to the new fee. By opting to wake up earlier to beat the
traffic and the fee, they are demanding a slightly less popular service (a 7:30 arrival rather
than an 8:00 arrival) and in return are paying a lower cost by avoiding the surcharge. Or
two drivers might elect to carpool.
248 See Rafi Mohammed, The Problem with Price Gouging Laws, HARV. BUS. REV.
(July 23, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/07/the-problem-with-price-gouging-laws [https://perma.
cc/4XQG-M2HY] (noting that limits on price gouging encourage hoarding and discourage
businesses from boosting supplies).
249 See Stein, supra note 30, at 12–14.
250 See Geoffrey C. Rapp, Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the Legal
and Economic Aspects of Post-Disaster Price Regulation, 94 KY. L.J. 535, 541–50 (200506) (discussing representative state laws).
251 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5103 (prohibiting charging prices “grossly in
excess of the price generally charged for the same or similar goods or services in the usual course
of business” immediately prior to the events giving rise to the state of emergency following a
terrorist attack); cf. Ezra Rosser, Exploiting the Poor: Housing, Markets, and Vulnerability, 126
YALE L.J. F. 458, 475 (2017) (book review) (arguing that “housing emergencies do not cease being
emergencies simply because they are of a continuing nature”).
252 Uber may sometimes wish that such anti-gouging measures were in place.
See, e.g., Dan Macguill, Did Uber Increase Its Prices in London After a Terror Attack?,
SNOPES (June 5, 2017), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/uber-increase-london-attack/
[https://perma.cc/VTT3-YEXX] (“What’s True: Uber prices did go up in London and in
the vicinity of the attack. What’s False: This price surge happened automatically due to
algorithms that observed increased demand, and was later stopped by the company.”).
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one person views as gouging another might simply call dynamic
pricing in the purest sense.253
Even modest efforts to redistribute gains generated by the
sharing economy are likely to engender political opposition from
those who are profiting and would prefer to retain more of their
new benefits rather than less. Those who gain as the economy
evolves often are more politically astute than those who suffer,
and they will fight having to relinquish some of the gains they
might otherwise enjoy.254 They probably view themselves as
innovators who are being penalized for their originality and
entrepreneurship. If these beneficiaries are unwilling to
contribute to the well-being of those who fall behind as the
economy changes, and if they resist attempts to force any type of
redistribution, then this type of reallocation is less likely to occur.
Moving toward this type of efficiency, particularly when
necessities, inelastic items, or public goods are involved, may be
politically shrewd. The 2016 presidential campaign demonstrated
to many who have benefited from recent economic transformations
that those who are lagging are politically motivated to resist
change and return to the status quo ante. If the continued
expansion of the sharing economy increases the chasm between
those who are more and less affluent, it is likely to face ongoing
opposition and resistance from those who are lagging. Those who
are benefiting would be wise to heed the warning signs.
One variation of this approach that would not necessarily
require government action is for a greater number of sharing
economy platforms to move toward cooperative co-ownership by
service providers.255 Under this model, ride-sharing drivers
might be given the option after a certain amount of time to

253 Some economists “contend that anti-gouging measures, by effectively
enacting price controls during emergencies, remove the incentive for consumers to
conserve essential supplies. They also say that the incentive for suppliers to bring goods
to dangerous areas—or keep extra stock on-hand before disasters—becomes distorted in
ways that hurt people.” Andrew Ross Sorkin, Hurricane Price Gouging Is Despicable,
Right? Not to Some Economists, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), https://mobile.nytimes.com/
2017/09/11/business/hurricane-price-gouging.html?action=click&module=Discovery&pg
type=Homepage [https://perma.cc/HMQ7-JAUR]. Moreover, anti-price-gouging laws can
lead to black markets, scalping of essential goods, and favoritism, which may be no fairer
than allowing the market to price the commodities dynamically. Id. But while “these
arguments may make sense in the most theoretical context, . . . when it comes to trying
to protect the poorest among us, who can’t afford the most basic of goods, they seem like
an inhumane affront to our sensibilities.” Id.
254 See, e.g., Jon Henley, Uber Clashes with Regulators in Cities Around the World,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/sep/29/uber-clashes
-with-regulators-in-cities-around-the-world [https://perma.cc/CW3F-MHNC] (providing
examples of disputes between Uber and different regulatory bodies).
255 Nothing in this model would preclude partial co-ownership by consumers as well.
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purchase stock in the corporation that operates the platform.256
In this way, the gains that the new economy generates will be
distributed more evenly than they have been so far,257 though not
necessarily to all of those who are displaced.258 Transforming
ride-share drivers into owners would spread the benefits of firm
ownership more widely and allow workers to benefit from the
growth of the sharing economy in more than one way.259 New
competitors to incumbent companies that offer this benefit
might be able to induce drivers to join the newer networks.260
2. Private Intervention
Rather than acting under government mandate, the new
economy’s beneficiaries might choose to provide benefits of this
type voluntarily.261 Many of the entrepreneurs who have profited
wildly from the new economy recognize that they are gaining from
major paradigm shifts they participated in creating. Some of these
entrepreneurs have become philanthropic at very young ages, and
some have developed very specific goals for their philanthropy.262
Private efforts probably cannot cover all the losses of those
who suffer as the economy continually evolves. Moreover, some of
these private philanthropists—unlike government actors—may
impose conditions on their generosity that some prospective
beneficiaries do not wish to meet or may simply target their
philanthropy toward other goals.263 But the private sector seems
aware of the problem and has taken some steps to confront it.264
Sundararajan, supra note 243, at 508.
Id. (“[T]he single most important broad policy guideline is to favor platform
models that lead to genuine and decentralized capital ownership.”).
258 Taxi drivers, for example, do not benefit if Uber drivers receive shares in Uber.
259 See, e.g., SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 160, at 86 (describing the transition of
“the role of the crowd from being the source of capital and labor to actually owning and
running the marketplace in a decentralized fashion”); id. at 125 (“[A]s the lines between
producer and consumer blur, it certainly seems clear that great potential exists to expand
the fraction of the population that owns wealth-producing assets.”); Zale, supra note 53, at
1014–15 (discussing the benefits of cooperative platforms that are owned by participants).
260 See Sheelah Kolhatkar, Juno Takes On Uber, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/?p=3259135&mbid=social_tablet_e [https://perma.cc/Z8QCDSWV] (discussing Uber competitor that seeks to induce Uber drivers to switch to Juno
by offering them higher pay and better benefits).
261 See SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 160, at 138 (discussing “models in which users
and providers are equally invested and responsible for enacting the regulations in question”).
262 See, e.g., Eric Franklin Amarante, The Perils of Philanthrocapitalism, 78 MD. L.
REV. 1, 9 (2018) (describing “philanthrocapitalists [who] dictate the narrative and demand
more involvement in the decisions of how and where to spend philanthropic dollars”).
263 See id. at 13–43 (critiquing the antidemocratic, paternalistic, and amateurish
aspects of philanthropy).
264 See Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and Innovation in the
Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116, 123–29 (2015) (discussing
a variety of “self-regulatory organizations”).
256
257
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In fact, some of the companies that directly benefit from the
sharing economy have incentives to regulate themselves—in part,
to head off government mandates—particularly if they announce
these initiatives well in advance. Uber, for example, has
suggested that it will provide educational and training benefits
for drivers who are later made obsolete by self-driving cars, an
approach that may help attract and retain drivers today.265
There are a handful of settings in which more affluent
people are willing to shell out higher prices than their less
fortunate fellow citizens pay for a good. Many universities make
need-based financial aid available to prospective students who
might not be able to afford attendance without it. This means
that students from wealthier families pay the sticker price while
their less-well-heeled classmates receive grants or low-rate
loans to cover some portion of the cost. Two roommates may
receive the exact same education, but one of them could be
paying tens of thousands of dollars more for it.266 Moreover, the
affluent families may also be making charitable contributions to
the institution, further enhancing the price disparity. This type
of voluntary redistributive transfer dovetails well with the
progressive property movement, which recognizes that property
owners bear responsibilities even as they enjoy the privileges of
their property rights.267
In settings in which stark price differences for the same
good lead to resistance by those asked to pay more, it is possible
to offer different versions of the good with different levels of
amenities, as noted earlier.268 All the seats on an airplane reach
their destination at the same time, but some passengers are
willing to pay considerably more for the wider, swankier ones
with better food. In the university setting, the differences may be
more subtle, such as nicer dormitories or the ability to forego
summer income for a prestigious internship. But if higher-income
families are willing to pay considerably more to educate their
children, it might be possible to convince these consumers that
265 Josh Constine, Uber Considers Steering Drivers to “Vocational Training” as Cars
Go Autonomous, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 16, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/11/16/ubervocational-training/ [https://perma.cc/L782-RM3P]. See generally Calo & Rosenblat, supra
note 45, at 1668–70 (discussing conflicts of interest among sharing platforms, their workers,
and their customers).
266 See, e.g., How Aid Works, HARV. C. GRIFFIN FIN. AID OFF., https://college.
harvard.edu/financial-aid/how-aid-works [https://perma.cc/FS77-UA3Q] (“Families who
have significant assets will be asked to pay more.”).
267 See Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 743, 744 (2009) (“Because of the equal value of each human being,
property laws should promote the ability of each person to obtain the material resources
necessary for full social and political participation.”).
268 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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there are other settings in which differential pricing is acceptable
and socially beneficial.269 This seems like a particularly effective
approach with regard to services, which are harder to resell at a
profit, though perhaps less so for goods.270
3. Hybrid Action
The previous two subsections have suggested that the
actions needed to mitigate inequities caused by the growth of the
sharing economy can either occur voluntarily or be mandated by
the government.271 Some approaches involve using both
methods, or they fall between these two extremes and can be
structured in an intermediate manner. One model, already
noted above, is to impose a fee on those who benefit from new
efforts at dynamic pricing and use the proceeds to fund programs
such as job retraining, mid-career education, and alternatives to
the costlier new service.272 This model would likely take the form
of a mandate, as noted, though a hybrid variant that might
succeed in some settings is the use of a voluntary fee. A onedollar assessment charged on Lyft rides—paid by the passenger,
Lyft, or both—can provide retraining for medallion holders who
wish to transition into a new career or to expand bus service for
those residents who cannot afford shared rides. A sales tax
imposed on Airbnb stays, similar to a hotel tax, can provide
housing subsidies to those who face unaffordable rent increases
if the housing stock shrinks as rental apartments are converted
to shared units.273 Part of the congestion fee a large city charges
269 Here, I use the term “differential pricing” to represent a model in which more
affluent consumers pay higher prices. Contrast this with another type of differential
pricing in which just the reverse happens, see supra note 118 and accompanying text
(discussing differential pricing in grocery stores in poor neighborhoods), and also with
price discrimination, in which a seller estimates precisely how much each prospective
buyer can be cajoled into spending, irrespective of each buyer’s financial status, see supra
note 117 and accompanying text.
270 When goods are involved, the person receiving the price discount might be
tempted to engage in arbitrage and resell the good at a profit to the more affluent person
who would otherwise have to pay full price. See supra note 36 (discussing this phenomenon
with regard to Super Bowl tickets). It is easier to scalp goods such as football tickets than
services such as a university education.
271 See supra Sections IV.B.1–2.
272 See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
273 One group of researchers has concluded that the incentives to transform longterm rental apartments into Airbnb units have dropped considerably. Peter Coles et al.,
Airbnb Usage Across New York City Neighborhoods: Geographic Patterns and Regulatory
Implications, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 108, 118
(Nestor M. Davidson et al. eds., 2018) (as of June 2017, “to match long-term rental revenue,
hosts would have to have their homes booked over 216 days a year, the ‘break-even’ number
of short-term rental nights. Placed in context, . . . the median number of nights booked for
a typical entire home listing in New York City was 46.”).
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to drive in the crowded downtown can subsidize mass transit for
those who can no longer use roads on which space is rationed by
price rather than willingness to endure delays.274
User fees such as these may prove to be less unpopular
than broader-based taxation schemes, as they charge only the
beneficiaries of a new service and direct the proceeds to assist
those being forced to adapt. They internalize specific externalities
more precisely, thereby preventing non-users from having to
subsidize the activities of others. Such a fee will probably have to
take the form of a government requirement but could also be
structured as a non-binding recommendation. Tipping, which is
customary in a wide range of service industries, illustrates a type
of non-mandated transfer from a customer to a service provider.
Norms and social pressure encourage patrons to tip even if they
know they will never interact with that provider again. A transfer
fee of the type just described might succeed on an entirely
voluntary basis, or it might be established as a mandate that is
tolerated with only minimal grumbling.
Licensing requirements can play a role similar to transfer
fees. Requiring Lyft drivers to obtain medallions, demonstrate
their familiarity with local roadways, and prove that they carry
adequate insurance might have to take the form of government
regulation. But it differs little from rules requiring lawyers to pay
hefty annual licensing fees, with the receipts used to assist those
who have suffered at the hands of less scrupulous members of the
bar.275 The license demonstrates mastery, signals the attainment
of proficiency, and serves as the government’s imprimatur. The
government requires payment from those who wish to enjoy a
privilege, and in some cases a monopoly. Voluntary variants of
these models sometimes succeed, and various private entities
have established non-binding endorsement mechanisms that
some service providers pursue even though they do not have to.276
Reputational ratings used by many sharing platforms can also
serve as a substitute for government regulation.277 Once again,
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
See Frequently Asked Questions, LAW. FUND FOR CLIENT PROTECTION ST. N.Y.,
http://www.nylawfund.org/faq.html [https://perma.cc/BRZ6-2B8C] (noting that this fund
offers “reimbursement to law clients who have lost money or property as a result of a lawyer’s
dishonest conduct in the practice of law. . . . The fund is financed by the 278,000 members of the
legal profession in New York State through a registration fee required by law.”).
276 See, e.g., Our Mission: Working for a Safer World, UL, https://www.ul.com/
about/mission [https://perma.cc/5FRJ-GZ7Q] (providing its mission statement, including
“working for a safer world”); Marks and Labels, UL.COM, https://www.ul.com/marks/
[https://perma.cc/94H7-AW75] (“The UL Mark is the single most accepted Certification
Mark in the United States, appearing on 22 billion products annually.”).
277 See, e.g., Daniel K. McDonald, Reputation Will Teach the Sharing Economy to
Share, 27 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 229–35 (2016) (discussing the value of reputation
274
275
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private action, public mandates, or a combination of the two can
accomplish the same goal.
Even market participants who object strenuously to
government regulation will have to concede at some level that hybrid
actions such as these are fair and afford value to them. The fact that
they pay a fee or opt to obtain a license demonstrates that
government or private authorization still has positive net worth to
them even after paying its cost. Some licensees might even have
been willing to contribute to such a fund had these contributions
been merely encouraged. Automobile drivers, for example, rarely
complain about the requirement that they obtain and pay for a
drivers’ license before operating a motor vehicle, and some do not
object to obtaining mandated liability insurance. Many would do so
even if it were optional.
A hybrid model, then, might include mandatory elements
such as transfer fees, licensing requirements, and compulsory
insurance, alongside voluntary features, including tipping,
reputational rankings, and optional add-ons. Some sharing
platforms already demonstrate many of these characteristics.
Government and private actors may be able to cooperate to
provide some of the types of protection this article recommends.
4. No Intervention
A final possibility is to do nothing, an option that may be
more appropriate with regard to the owner of a single Airbnb
unit than the landlord of a large number of short-term rental
apartments. This suggestion is not intended as a celebration of
the free market but rather as a recognition that technology is
evolving so quickly that rapid change might make any
government action obsolete or even counter-productive before it
can have any positive impact. To a considerable extent, resourceallocation problems may prove to be self-correcting: The same
advances in algorithms that have allowed the sharing economy
to expand so rapidly may also allow for more nimble responses
to changes in supply and demand.
As suppliers of goods and services accumulate and
analyze the huge amounts of digital information now available
to them, they will become more adept at predicting future
market changes. Home-improvement stores already follow
weather reports and direct generators, chainsaws, and bottled
water to stores in the path of an approaching storm. With
as a capital asset); Thierer et al., supra note 64, at 875 (arguing that reputational rankings
reduce the need for regulation).
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continuing increases in the capacity to analyze big data, Uber
can notify its drivers of a cloudburst that will arrive in twenty
minutes or a concert that will end in ten, allowing them to hit
the road just as demand swells. The next iteration of the sharing
economy may have the built-in capacity to mitigate the
drawbacks of its predecessors.
As we continue to harness new technologies, predictive
software will increasingly be able to anticipate shortages or
surpluses. This will allow buyers and sellers to respond to
changes as they happen and will dampen price volatility. Supply
and demand curves can thereby move more gradually and in
tandem, reducing sharp price swings and uncertainty. Surprises
will still occur, but as recent technological changes settle into
place and new approaches continue to be developed, our ability
to manage the massive quantities of information we are now
accumulating will improve. The sudden revolution that is
occurring now, characterized by significant price uncertainty,
will transform into a more gradual evolution, with prices that
rise and fall more slowly and less surprisingly.278
It is also worth remembering that new technologies will
continue to have surprising and world-changing effects just as
the rapid spread of smartphones has done and that the legal
system will be hard pressed to keep up with these continuing
transformations.279 Regulations will necessarily lag behind
sudden transitions, as they have for the rapid growth of ridesharing and home-sharing.280 Cities and counties may belatedly
attempt to regulate these new industries in a variety of ways,
and the industries will respond by lobbying state legislatures to
preempt this type of regulation.
Some innovators enter new markets knowing that their
business model may be of questionable legality, with the intent
of challenging and changing existing norms and laws.281 They
278 See, e.g., Tayo Fabusuyi & Robert C. Hampshire, Rethinking Performance
Based Pricing: A Case Study of SFPark, 115 TRANS. RES. PART A: POL’Y & PRAC. 90 (2018)
(claiming to improve on San Francisco’s pricing algorithm for public parking by factoring
in elasticity of demand and thereby pricing parking based on predicted demand rather
than actual demand).
279 See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Through the Lens of Innovation, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
951, 977–85 (2016) (describing the unique aspects of entrepreneurship and arguing that
the legal system needs to take care not to act as a drag on innovation).
280 See Orly Lobel, Regulating the Sharing Economy: Self-Governance, Efficiency
& Values 6 (Univ. of S.D. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 19-419, 2019), https://papers.ss
rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3473215 [https://perma.cc/HP9T-FC3Z] (“Regulators
must consider the continued value in certain regulatory requirements in the face of a new
market model and changing preferences and norms.”).
281 See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90
S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 403–06 (2017) (describing start-up businesses that plan from the
outset to mobilize satisfied customers so they can change laws that may limit their
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know they are creating regulatory uncertainty, and they intend
to win the war of popular opinion before the government realizes
what is happening and can respond, as Uber has done so
successfully in many jurisdictions and as providers of shared
electric scooters are trying to do.282 These new industries are
engaging in a type of regulatory arbitrage.283 This raises the
question of how well-suited existing laws are to regulating new
platforms.284 By the time government bodies consider acting, the
public has already accepted and endorsed the new business
model.285 By then, the technology may have moved ahead still
further, with any new regulations addressing only yesterday’s
problems,286 just as regulations designed for hotels seem a poor
fit for short-term rentals.287
Moreover, regulation of this type could squelch future
innovation.288 New business models have unquestionably created
numerous benefits, and we do not wish to preclude entirely the

operations); Ronald A. Klain, The Downside to All Those Scooters and Dockless Bikes
Appearing in Our Cities, WASH. POST (June 20, 2018, 5:47 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/the-downside-to-all-those-scooters-and-dockless-bikes-appearing-inour-cities/2018/06/20/9e492c74-73f6-11e8-9780-b1dd6a09b549_story.html?noredirect=
on&utm_term=.7653a262410f [https://perma.cc/9SUQ-L7KJ] (“[W]e have largely shifted
the decision-making about how people should get around our cities from public
authorities and public investments to private companies and private investors”).
282 See Nikil Saval, The Scooting Life: Are Electric Scooters Worth the Trouble?,
NEW YORKER (July 11, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/dept-of-design/the-sco
oting-life-are-electric-scooters-worth-the-trouble [https://perma.cc/YNT7-M8YW] (“When I
asked a spokesperson for the city of Nashville why Bird [scooters] did it this way, she suggested
that it followed ride-sharing companies’ ‘don’t ask for permission, ask for forgiveness’ model.”);
cf. Davidson & Infranca, supra note 86, at 273–74 (suggesting that this approach also may lead
to collaboration between business and government).
283 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 20, 156–60 (discussing ways in which new platforms
seek to avoid the application of existing laws that were designed to address somewhat
different problems).
284 Id. at 144 (“[I]t is both true that the platform should be understood in light of
basic legal principles that existed before its rise and that . . . there is something new and
unique about the law of the platform.”).
285 See, e.g., Eric Biber et al., Regulating Business Innovation as Policy Disruption:
From the Model T to Airbnb, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1578-87 (2017) (discussing different ways
this problem can arise and different methods of addressing it). For an interesting
international comparison, see Shitong Qiao, Dealing with Illegal Housing: What Can New
York City Learn from Shenzhen?, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 713, 714 (2017) (discussing illegal
housing units in Shenzhen, China, that have become so popular—housing over eight million
people—that it would be futile to crack down on them post hoc).
286 See, e.g., Gregory M. Stein, The Impact of Autonomous Vehicles on Urban
Land Use Patterns, 48 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (describing the risks and
benefits of government action while a technology is rapidly evolving).
287 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 122, at 168 (“[T]he unique intimacy and informality
of the sharing economy make traditional regulation unlikely to succeed”).
288 See Sundararajan, supra note 243, at 509 (“Often, crowd-based providers
and the platforms that enable them emerge without formal government approval. It is
critical that this ‘experimental’ nature of innovation is preserved.”).
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ability to build on these gains.289 Innovative technologies will
continue to lap regulators’ capacities to regulate them.290 To the
extent regulators do adopt new laws, those laws may need to
change as rapidly as the technology that motivated them.291
This suggests that the private sector, and especially
these new industries themselves, will play a large role in
determining what new norms develop and how the legal system
will respond to these norms.292 Earlier, I suggested that private
redistributive action designed to mitigate rising inequality may
be more politically palatable than public action with the same
goals. But it is important to recognize that some public action
will be little more than a response to aggressive, self-interested
action by private actors from the new economy. In cases such as
this, private activity may serve as a direct challenge to public
norms and may seek to change or disregard them. The market
disrupter may be hostile to any redistribution that could
undercut its business model and disappoint its shareholders. In
settings such as these, to the extent restrictions are merited,
only public restrictions will be effective. And by the time
government entities consider them, it may already be too late.293
Public policy makers must remember that they are trying to
achieve two goals that are partially incompatible. First, they want
to encourage and facilitate technological advances, which are
becoming more revolutionary and more rapid. Many of these
developments will prove to be inevitable, and it may be short-sighted
and futile to attempt to impede them.294 Localities and nations that
support innovation will benefit while others fall behind.

289 See Shapiro & McDonald, supra note 157, at 465 (“[I]t’s hard to innovate
when innovation itself is illegal.”).
290 See Cohen, supra note 62, at 136 (“Law for the platform economy is already
being written—not via discrete, purposive changes, but rather via the ordinary,
uncoordinated but self-interested efforts of information-economy participants and the
lawyers and lobbyists they employ.”).
291 See, e.g., Giovanni Quattrone et al., Who Benefits from the “Sharing”
Economy of Airbnb?, at 26 (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2738731 [https://perma.cc/26QM-24MQ] (“Our attempt contributes to the general idea of
‘algorithmic regulation,’ which argues for the analysis of large sets of data to produce
regulations that are responsive to real-time demands.”).
292 See Dyal-Chand, supra note 60, at 292 (asking whether the sharing economy
will become “the basis for redistributing resources, market participation, and ultimately
wealth to a broader range of individuals”).
293 See, e.g., Mark Fenwick et al., Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens When
Technology Is Faster than the Law?, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 561, 567–84 (2017) (discussing
the difficult timing issues in regulating disruptive new businesses).
294 Isaacson, supra note 56 (“Peer-to-peer technology may be disruptive, and its
effects can be messy. But it has an inexorable tendency to empower people to find—and
produce—new offerings that improve our lives by reinforcing the most basic rule of
entrepreneurship, which is to make something that people really want.”).
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Second, they must work to ensure that these new
developments do not exacerbate existing inequality by favoring
those who are already advantaged. Those who are falling further
behind in our modern economy may become even less able to
afford necessities, inelastic products, and public goods. With the
growth of the sharing economy, more and more goods and
services will be surge priced, causing them to become less
affordable when they are most needed. In addition, economic
transitions will occur more rapidly, causing economic
displacement more often and more quickly than in the past.
As increasingly rapid transitions leave some people in
their wake, we need to be attentive to potential increases in
inequality. Transformations such as these can seem unfair to
those who are left behind, whose expectations may be dashed.
They also can lead to economic and political unrest and backlash
against changes that may be desirable overall but harmful to
some along the way. Moreover, those who profit today should
recognize that they could be tomorrow’s casualties.295
CONCLUSION
Technological developments are accelerating. To the
extent that the growth of the sharing economy leads to greater
and speedier innovation, it creates numerous advantages. The
economy can function more smoothly, as people have greater
access than ever before to the information they need to make
rational, wise economic decisions. Transactions costs shrink. Over
time, this exuberant and unpredictable market will begin to
settle, and market participants will grow accustomed to the new
rules governing the structure and speed of economic markets.
This growth has also, predictably, created fallout. Some
of these repercussions could easily cause those who are already
economically vulnerable to fall further behind, thereby
expanding existing inequalities. The growth of the sharing
economy and the increased use of dynamic pricing have led to
increases in price volatility and unpredictability, which may
cause those in the weakest economic position to suffer even
more. This is of particular concern when those who are lagging
are unable to obtain necessities, inelastic goods, or public goods.
These are the settings in which government action or other
intervention may be warranted.
295 See, e.g., Peter Eavis, WeWork Will Lay Off 2,400 Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/21/business/wework-layoffs.html [https://per
ma.cc/522A-XU6A].
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Innovative disrupters would be wise to recognize the
responsibility they bear for mitigating some of the damage their
changes cause to others. No one expected early automobile
manufacturers to compensate buggy makers and farriers. At the
same time, today’s auto may rapidly become tomorrow’s horse
and buggy—what has become of the tens of thousands of
videocassette rental stores that blossomed in the 1980s and
1990s?—and the durational arc of an industry’s rise and fall is
shorter than in the past. The masters of new industries should
be attentive to the needs of those they displace, as a moral
matter, as a matter of good business, and in recognition that
they may end up on the wrong side of the next innovation curve
more quickly than they imagine.
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